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PROTECTING THE AVATARS OF
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
WALTER GARY SHARP, SR.*
The world community needs, more than it has ever done, skilful and
disciplined warriors who are ready to put themselves at the service of
its authority. Such warriors must properly be seen as the protectors
of civilisation, not its enemies.
- John Keegan, A History of Warfare (1993)
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE
History will not view the twentieth century as one of peace. To
the contrary, this century has been called "mankind's most bloody
and hateful century," with international politics its greatest failure.'
As a result of this failure, this century over 87,000,000 combatants
and civilians were lost to war, and another estimated 80,000,000 per-
sons were deliberately killed by their own governments.2
History will, however, view the last half of the twentieth century
as one of great transformation-from a system of independent sover-
eign states allowed by international law to wage war and to slaughter
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1. ZBIGNIEW BRzEziNsKI, OUT OF CONTROL: GLOBAL TURMOIL ON THE EVE OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 4 (1993).
2- See id. at 7-18.
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their own citizens with impunity to a system of interdependent sover-
eign states now attempting to govern itself, protect human rights, and
enforce global peace. This peace, as defined by one of this century's
preeminent statesmen, "implies a certain quality of social relation-
ships such that no person within the domestic order, and no state
within the international order, need seriously fear violence from his
fellows."3
Despite its weaknesses, the United Nations has been the vehicle
of this transformation and is the world community's real legacy of the
twentieth century. The purposes of the United Nations are to
"maintain international peace and security," "develop friendly rela-
tions among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples," "achieve international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character," and "to be a centre for harmo-
nizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common
ends."4 In pursuing these purposes, the United Nations and its Mem-
ber States5 are required to act in accordance with seven principles
enumerated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations
(Charter). The most important of these principles, found in para-
graph 4 of Article 2, is the prohibition on the aggressive use of force.
Although the fundamental precepts underlying these principles are
the sovereign equality of all Member States and the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, Article 2 explicitly recognizes the primacy of the
Chapter VII enforcement authority of the United Nations Security
Council (Security Council) in matters within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state.6
The Member States of the United Nations have conferred upon
the Security Council the "primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their be-
half.",7 Two key chapters of the Charter provide the legal authority
3. EUGENE V. RosTow, TOWARD MANAGED PEACE 35 (1993).
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
5. Throughout the present Article, the term "Member States" refers to states that are
members of the United Nations.
6. Article 2(7) states that
nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to inter-
vene in matters which are essentialy within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
and Chapter VII.
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
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for the Security Council to maintain international peace and security.
Chapter VI provides for the pacific settlement of disputes, requiring
the parties to any dispute that may endanger international peace and
security to "seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, con-
ciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies
or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."8
Within this pacific settlement mechanism, the Security Council has
investigative powers and the authority to recommend appropriate
procedures or methods of adjustment.9 Should Chapter VI concilia-
tion fail, Chapter VII requires the Security Council, as the overseer
of international peace and security, to "determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and
to "make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security."1° Chapter VII of the Charter details the
coercive" authority of the Security Council without which the Secu-
rity Council would be entirely ineffective and the proscriptions of the
Charter against the aggressive use of force 2 would have no deterrent
value.
While the United Nations acts through regional organizations
and Member States, it must depend upon the individual to conduct
military operations. Regardless of whether the operation is a Chap-
ter VI observer mission or a Chapter VII enforcement action, it is the
individual peace-keeper or warfighter who actually accomplishes the
U.N. mandate. 3 John Keegan described these warriors in the epi-
8. Id. art. 33.
9. See id. arts. 34,36.
10. Id. art. 39.
11. The term "coercive" in this context includes all recommendations or measures im-
posed by the Security Council pursuant to its Chapter VII authority on a state that are binding
on that state notwithstanding its lack of consent. In contrast, the term "enforcement" is a sub-
set of coercive measures and connotes the use of military force.
12. These proscriptions on the aggressive use of force are found in paragraphs 3 and 4 of
Article 2 of the Charter:
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
13. A "mandate" in the context of the United Nations is an authoritative resolution com-
municating the decision of the Security Council that certain activities are either authorized or
directed. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-23, PEACE OPERATIONS, app. A at 66
(1994). In practice, the term mandate is sometimes used to refer to any resolution of either the
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graph to the present Article as "the protectors of civilisation." 4
These military personnel serve the world community and embody the
Charter's most cherished purpose-they are the world community's
avatars of international peace and security. Without these avatars to
implement the Security Council's coercive authority, the world com-
munity has no enforcement mechanism and international law has no
deterrent value. Therefore all military personnel who serve the
United Nations deserve the maximum protection that the world
community has to offer. This premise leads to the central point of
the present Article: How should the rule of law protect military per-
sonnel who participate in U.N. peace operations?
While the safety of all personnel serving the world community,
civilian and military, is of the greatest concern, the focus of this Arti-
cle is limited to a discussion of the protection of military personnel. I
have narrowed the focus in this manner because it is generally ac-
cepted that civilians who serve the international community always
deserve protection and should never be lawful targets." In contrast,
while the world community accepts that military personnel always
deserve protection, it still clings to the antiquated notion that under
certain circumstances military personnel should be lawful targets
notwithstanding that they serve the international community under
the authority of the United Nations. For example, the 1994 Conven-
tion on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
(Safety Convention) adopted by the General Assembly clearly em-
braces the concept that military personnel serving as combatants un-
der the authority of the Security Council are lawful targets of those
engaging in illegal aggression.16 The domestic equivalent of this posi-
tion would be to make police officers lawful targets of those unlaw-
fully robbing a bank. This position reflects pre-Charter thinking con-
doning the aggressive use of force and is therefore unacceptable.
The dangerous effect on U.N. forces of this pre-Charter thinking
can only be fully understood in the context of the range of operations
that are conducted under the authority of the United Nations and in
General Assembly or Security Council authorizing certain activities. See id
14. JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE 391 (1993).
15. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art. 146, Aug. 12,1949,6 U.S.T 3516,3616,75 U.N.T. 287,386; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts, art. 1(3), Dec. 12,1977,1125 U.N.T.S. 3,7,16 I.L.M. 1391,1397 (1977).
16. See Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, G.A. Res.
49159, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 141, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/59 (1994), reprinted in
34 I.L.M. 482 (1995) [hereinafter Safety Convention]. This aspect of the Safety Convention is
discussed in detail infra Part IV.C.
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the context of the existing legal protections accorded military per-
sonnel who serve the international community under its authority.
Accordingly, the next section will define and discuss the legal
authorities for the different types of U.N. peace operations that may
involve the deployment of military personnel. This analysis will be
followed by a survey of the existing legal protections for military
forces operating outside their flag state. An in depth analysis of the
weaknesses of the Safety Convention will then be used to highlight
the dangerousness of applying existing international law to modem
U.N. peace operations. This Article determines that the interna-
tional community expects and explicitly authorizes U.N. forces to use
armed force in self-defense and to accomplish its assigned mission
and concludes that U.N. forces are accorded in practice a special pro-
tected status. This Article recommends that the de facto protected
status of U.N. forces should be advanced and codified by a proposed
"Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Civilians and Military Forces
Operating Under the Authority of the United Nations." This draft
protocol would protect all personnel operating under the authority of
the United Nations, civilians and military, whether noncombatant or
combatant, and would make them unlawful targets under all circum-
stances.
II. UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS-DEFINITIONS
AND AUTHORITIES
Since there are no accepted definitions that clearly describe the
different types of modern U.N. peace operations, it is essential to be-
gin with an overview of the evolution of peace operations and a dis-
cussion of terminology. "U.N. peace operations" is a term I use gen-
erically to include all U.N. authorized operations involving the
deployment of military forces or personnel into an area of tension or
conflict in an effort to maintain or restore international peace and se-
curity. This term includes consensual, coercive, and enforcement op-
erations, and is a subset of the conflict management mechanisms
authorized by the Charter.
In An Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations defined five types of conflict management mechanisms: pre-
ventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement,
1996]
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and peace-building. This set of terms, however, does not allow for
distinctions between traditional and modem applications of peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement. To reflect modem operations, I
have subdivided twoof the Secretary-General's terms, peace-keeping
and peace-enforcement, into consensual peace-keeping, coercive
peace-keeping, neopeace-enforcement, and traditional peace-
enforcement. The end result is a set of seven terms that accurately
describe the full spectrum of U.N. conflict management mechanisms.
Nevertheless, in practice, conflict management is frequently tailored
to fit the specific circumstances of a particular dispute or conflict.
Consequently, all peace operations do not necessarily fall neatly into
only one of the following categorical definitions of conflict manage-
ment.
A. Preventive Diplomacy
Preventive diplomacy is the vanguard of conflict management
mechanisms. It is defined in An Agenda for Peace as "action to pre-
vent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing dis-
putes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the lat-
ter when they occur."18  Through confidence building measures
(CBMs) such as arms control monitoring, information exchanges, and
liaison officers, Member States develop transparency in their behav-
ior, thus cultivating the trust and confidence that reduces the likeli-
hood of tensions that may lead to conflict. 9 Conceptually, should
CBMs fail to prevent tensions, early warning institutions such as the
Economic and Social Council analyze economic, social, and political
trends to identify emerging threats to the peace," and fact-finding
develops the basis for a decision as to how to deploy preventive
measures.2 Preventive diplomacy may be conducted at the initiative
of any person or organization-intemational, governmental, or non-
governmental.'
17. AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY, PEACEMAKING AND PEACE-
KEEPING: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, paras. 20-21, 42-44, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-
S/24111 (1992), U.N. Sales No. E.95.I.15 (1995) [hereinafter AN AGENDA FOR PEACE].
18. Id. para. 20.
19. See id. para. 24.
20. See id. para. 26. The Economic and Social Council is one of the six principal organs of
the United Nations. Its function is to "make or initiate studies and reports with respect to in-
ternational economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters." U.N.
CHARTER arts. 7, 62.
21. See AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 17, para. 25.
22. See id. para. 23.
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The two preventive measures discussed in An Agenda for Peace
are preventive deployments and demilitarized zones. A preventive
deployment is undertaken when it is believed that a U.N. presence
will discourage the flare-up or spread of hostilities, or in the case of
an internal crisis, will alleviate suffering or control violence." Simi-
larly, demilitarized zones monitored by U.N. personnel can be estab-
lished to separate belligerents during a cessation of hostilities or at
the conclusion of a conflict. ' All preventive diplomacy mechanisms
are exclusively consent-based activities.
B. Peacemaking
When preventive diplomacy fails to prevent conflict, peacemak-
ing attempts to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through
those peaceful means set forth in Chapter VI of the Charter." Enti-
tled the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," Chapter VI details a num-
ber of dispute resolution options that focus on the involvement of the
Security Council. The first article of Chapter VI adds depth to the
principle found in Article 2(3) that all "Members shall settle their in-
ternational disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that interna-
tional peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." Article
33 provides that
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,
shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon
the parties to settle their dispute by such means.
Chapter VI also authorizes the parties to any dispute to submit it
to the attention of either the Security Council or General Assembly,"
and requires the parties who fail to settle a dispute to refer it to the
Security Council, which has the authority to recommend such terms
23. See id. paras. 28-32.
24. See id. para. 33.
25. See id. paras. 20, 34-41. For a detailed treatment of peacemaking, see U.N. OFFICE OF
LEGAL AFF., HANDBOOK ON THE PEACEFUL SETrLEMENT OF DISPuTEs BETWEEN STATES,
U.N. Doc. OLA/COD/2394, U.N. Sales No. E.92.V.7 (1992).
26. See U.N. CHARTER art. 35.
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of settlement as it considers appropriate27 The Security Council is
authorized to "investigate any dispute, or any situation that might
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute,"' and, at any
stage of a dispute, "recommend appropriate procedures or methods
of adjustment."'
The General Assembly also has a role in peacemaking. Article
14 of the Charter provides that "[T]he General Assembly may rec-
ommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, re-
gardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare
or friendly relations among nations. ' All forms of peacemaking are
exclusively consent-based activities.
C. Traditional Peace-Enforcement
Should peacemaking efforts fail to prevent conflict, the Charter
authorizes measures that provide for the collective security of the in-
ternational community. While Chapter VI only authorizes the Secu-
rity Council to make recommendations to settle disputes, Chapter
VII authorizes the Security Council to require parties to settle a dis-
pute in a certain manner and to enforce its decisions through sanc-
tions and, if necessary, the use of armed force. Although the desires
of the parties may be considered, consent is not required for the Se-
curity Council to take action under Chapter VII. This coercive
authority of the Security Council is limited, however, by the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations3 and to disputes that threaten
international peace and security.'
Articles 40 through 43 detail the coercive authority of the Secu-
rity Council. Provisional measures, such as calling for a cease-fire be-
tween parties to a conflict, are authorized by Article 40. Article 41
allows the Security Council to require Member States to apply af-
firmative measures not involving the use of armed force. These
measures include, but are not limited to, "complete or partial inter-
ruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,
27. See id. art. 37.
28. Id. art. 34.
29. Id. art. 36.
30. This authority is subject to the provisions of Article 12 of the Charter, which provides
that while "the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions
assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommenda-
tion with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests." U.N.
CHARTER art. 12.
31. Id. art. 24(2).
32 See id. arts. 25, 39.
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radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of dip-
lomatic relations."33 The Security Council is also authorized by Arti-
cle 42 to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be neces-
sary to maintain or restore international peace and security." These
measures include, but are not limited to, "demonstrations, blockade,
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations."'
The armed forces to be used by the Security Council for meas-
ures taken pursuant to Article 42 were to be established under Arti-
cle 43 of the Charter, which provides that all Member States
"undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and
in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces,
assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the
purpose of maintaining international peace and security." Accord-
ingly, the mission of Article 43 forces was defined in terms of Article
39 of the Charter, i.e., to serve the Security Council in the exercise of
its responsibility to maintain or restore international peace and secu-
rity." In 1946, the Security Council directed the Military Staff Com-
mittee (MSC) to examine Article 43 and make recommendations to
the Security Council for its implementation.36 The MSC, however,
was unable to specify the parameters for Article 43 forces due to
disagreements founded in political distrust among members of the
Security Council over the total size of the force, the relative sizes of
the contributions of the permanent members of the Security Council,
the location of the forces when not in use, the provision of assistance
and facilities, and logistical support.37 Fifty years later, it remains un-
likely that Article 43 forces will be stood up in the near future. 8
This use of armed force by the Security Council is the only use of
military forces clearly contemplated by the Charter. Under existing
33. Id. art. 41.
34. Id. art. 42.
35. See D.W. BOwErr, UNITED NATIONS FORCES 14 (1964).
36. See iL at 13. Article 47 of the U.N. Charter provides that a Military Staff Committee
will be established "to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the
Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of arma-
ments, and possible disarmament."
37. BOWETr, supra note 35, at 15-18.
38. See AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 17, para. 44. For a more hopeful view of the
utility of Article 43, see Alan K. Henrikson, The United Nations and Regional Organizations:
"King-Links" of a "Global Chain", 7 DUKEIJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 35,62-68 (1996).
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international law, these Article 43 forces would be belligerent forces
in an international armed conflict and could be lawfully targeted by
the state against which the Security Council was taking enforcement
action." An Agenda for Peace defines this use of armed force as
"peace-enforcement," giving as examples situations where the Secu-
rity Council authorizes military action in response to outright aggres-
sion, imminent or actual, with forces made available to the Security
Council on a permanent basis under Article 43 of the Charter." To
distinguish this use of military forces from other uses by the United
Nations, I refer to these operations as "traditional peace-
enforcement."
D. Neopeace-Enforcement
Although the Security Council has never used its Article 42
authority as contemplated by the drafters of the Charter, it has
authorized Member States to take military enforcement measures on
its behalf four times.4' In two of these situations, the Korean War
and the Persian Gulf War, the armed forces acting on behalf of the
United Nations were belligerent forces in an international armed
conflict,42 and therefore, under existing international law, the person-
nel who served in these armed forces were lawful targets.43
In 1992, the Secretary-General identified the need for a new
concept of peace-enforcement by Member States in An Agenda for
Peace. In recognizing that the Security Council "chose to authorize
Member States to take measures on its behalf" in the situation be-
tween Iraq and KuwaitM the Secretary-General recommended that
the Security Council "consider the utilization of peace-enforcement
39. See BOwErr, supra note 35, at 55,485,490,499-500 (1964); Hague Convention IV Re-
specting the Laws of and Customs of War on Land, Annex (Regulations), arts. 22-28, Oct. 18,
1907,36 Stat. 2295,2301-03,1 Bevans 643,647-49 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations].
40. See AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 17, paras. 42-44.
41. U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFO., THE UNrrED NATIONS AND SOMALIA: 1992-1996, at 33,
U.N. Doc. DPI/1677, U.N. Sales No. E. 96.1.8 (1996) [hereinafter THE UNrrED NATIONS AND
SOMALIA]. This text is Vol. VIII of the United Nations Blue Book Series. These military ac-
tions "were in response to attacks on the Republic of Korea in 1950,. . .the interception of
tankers carrying oil to Southern Rhodesia in 1966, and twice concerning the Iraq-Kuwait con-
flict in 1990 and 1991." Id.; see also BOUTROS BouTRos-GHALI, SUPPLEMENT TO AN
AGENDA FOR PEACE, paras. 77-78, U.N. Doc. A150160-S/1995/1, U.N. Sales No. E.95.I.15
(1995) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTTO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE].
42. See SUPPLEMENTTO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 41, para. 78.
43. See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 39, arts. 22-28,36 Stat. at 2301-03, 1 Bevans at
647-49.
44. See AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 17, para. 42.
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units [under the command of the Secretary-General] in clearly de-
fined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in ad-
vance."4 The thinking of the Secretary-General evolved in his 1995
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, where he also recognized the
need for the Security Council to entrust enforcement actions to
groups of Member States.' To distinguish the practice of the Secu-
rity Council to contract out enforcement operations to Member
States from traditional peace-enforcement, I refer to these operations
as "neopeace-enforcement."
E. Consensual Peace-Keeping
The Charter did not explicitly provide for any conflict manage-
ment mechanisms that fall between Chapter VI diplomatic concilia-
tion and Chapter VII coercive measures.47 Given the absence of Ar-
ticle 43 forces and the inability of the Security Council to maintain
unity during the Cold War, a concept of peace-keeping evolved that
allowed the United Nations to use armed forces volunteered by
Member States to police the peace in a territory of a state when it
had the state's consent to do so.y These consensual peace-keeping
operations involved armed forces in the field as a practical way to
"halt or contain the fighting in a conflict while concerted efforts are
made to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table or other-
wise provide the time and create the climate necessary to bring about
a peaceful settlement.,
49
The first U.N. consensual peace-keeping force was established
by the General Assembly in 1956 pursuant to its authority set forth in
Chapter IV of the Charter.' The 1949 General Armistice Agreement
45. Id. para. 44.
46. See SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 41, paras. 77-80.
47. U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFO., EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS: A HANDBOOK ON THE
WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 97 (10th ed. 1986), U.N. Sales No. E.85.I.24 [hereinafter
EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS].
48. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How
WE USE IT 173-176 (1994).
49. EERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS, supra note 47, at 97-98.
50. U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFO., THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACE-KEEPING 43 (2d ed.), U.N. Doc. DPI/1065, U.N. Sales No. E.90.I.18 (1990) [hereinafter
THE BLUE HELMETS]. This entire paragraph is a brief summary of the detailed discussion of
the creation of UNEF found in chapter III of THE BLUE HELMETS, at pp. 43-78. The first
peace-keeping operation, which did not entail the deployment of a force as such, was the
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). UNTSO was an observer mission
established during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 to supervise the truce called for by the Security
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failed to prevent the relations between Egypt and Israel from dete-
riorating. Years of Egyptian-supported raids by the Palestinians and
Israeli reprisals prompted Egypt in the early 1950s to restrict Israeli
shipping through the Suez Canal. Poor relations turned to conflict
when Israel invaded Egypt on October 29, 1956. On October 31,
France and the United Kingdom, both of whom had cooperated with
Israel in its attack, landed troops at the northern end of the Suez Ca-
nal in an effort to separate the belligerents and ensure the safety of
shipping through the Canal. Although the Security Council was ac-
tively engaged, it was unable to adopt a condemnatory resolution
over the vetoes of the United Kingdom and France. At the proposal
of Yugoslavia, the matter was transferred to the General Assembly,
which adopted a resolution on November 7 creating the United Na-
tions Emergency Force (UNEF). The function of UNEF was to se-
cure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. In its enabling resolu-
tions, the General Assembly clearly stated that UNEF could only
enter and operate in Egypt with the consent of all nations concerned.
After the historic UNEF precedent, the Security Council contin-
ued to use consensual peace-keeping forces in a variety of ways, such
as dispute settlement mechanisms and humanitarian relief opera-
tions. For example, when Egyptian-Israeli hostilities flared up again
on October 6, 1973, the Security Council created UNEF II at the re-
quest of Egypt to monitor the cease-fire between it and Israel.5 Also,
in response to the tragic humanitarian conditions in Somalia and the
inability of the international relief organizations to operate among
the warring factions, the Security Council in 1992 established a
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to serve as a secu-
rity force.52
U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined these
peace-keeping operations in 1992 as
the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto
with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving
United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently ci-
vilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the pos-
sibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of
peace.53
Council. See id. at 9,15.
51. For a detailed discussion of UNEF II, see id. at 79-98.
52. See S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (1992).
53. AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 17, para. 20.
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The key aspect of Chapter VI operations that deploy armed
forces is that they are present in the territory of a sovereign state only
because that state has consented to their presence. However, the
Secretary-General defined peace-keeping as a deployment "hitherto
with the consent of all the parties concerned."-" This is his recogni-
tion that peace-keeping has now evolved to include actions author-
ized by Chapter VII that do not require the consent of the parties
concerned but are for limited purposes short of stopping an aggres-
sor. To distinguish between these two types of peace-keeping, I refer
to Chapter VI operations as "consensual peace-keeping" and Chap-
ter VII operations as "coercive peace-keeping." Consensual peace-
keepers are not belligerents and are not lawful targets, even though
they may be deployed into areas of ongoing hostilities.
F. Coercive Peace-Keeping
In December of 1992, the Security Council made an unprece-
dented departure from traditional, consensual peace-keeping phi-
losophy when it adopted the following language in Resolution 794:
"Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, [the
Security Council] authorizes the Secretary-General and Member
States cooperating.., to use all necessary means to establish as soon
as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations
in Somalia."55 For the first time, the Security Council explicitly used
Chapter VII authority to allow a coercive peace-keeping force to use
all necessary means during a humanitarian intervention in a territory
without the consent of the state or all parties to the conflict, while
remaining a non-belligerent. The United States took the lead under
the authority of Resolution 794 by forming "Joint Task Force-
Somalia" to serve as the unified command and control element for
the multinational force deploying to Somalia.56
Resolution 794 was a momentous step toward recognition of the
full breadth of the coercive authority of the Security Council. Before
the entry into force of the Charter, an armed force deployed in the
territory of a sovereign state without its consent was considered a
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/794 (1992).
56. See JOHN L. HIRSCH & ROBERT B. OAKLEY, SOMALIA AND OPERATION RESTORE
HOPE: REFLECTIONS ON PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING 45 (1995). This work provides
an excellent operational history and political reflection on the international community's policy
in Somalia.
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belligerent army of occupation; it was considered, without exception,
a violation of a state's sovereignty to deploy armed forces in its terri-
tory without its consent.7 Member States, however, have ceded a
portion of their sovereignty to the Security Council in matters of in-
ternational peace and security. They have conferred upon the Secu-
rity Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security,5s and have agreed that they will "accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with
the present Charter."' 9 Should the Security Council decide under Ar-
ticle 39 of the Charter that it is necessary to deploy an armed force in
the territory of a state without the its consent in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security, it has the authority to do so.
The only exception to this authority was carved out in Article 27 of
the Charter, providing a veto for the five permanent members of the
Seciklity- Council. Although the veto has been used much more
broadly, the original understanding among the five permanent mem-
bers was that "the veto was to be used only if the passage of a resolu-
tion could otherwise culminate in military action against one of
them."16
Since Resolution 794, the Security Council has continued to ex-
ercise its Chapter VII authority to deploy coercive peace-keeping
forces under nonconsensual circumstances. In March 1993, the Secu-
rity Council extended its Chapter VI humanitarian relief efforts in
Somalia when it created an expanded United Nations Operations in
Somalia (UNOSOM II) under Chapter VII.61 "All necessary means"
were authorized again in 1994 when the situation in Haiti continued
to constitute a threat to peace and security in the region. 2 Similarly,
57. See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 39, arts. 42-56,36 Stat. at 2306-09, 1 Bevans at
651-53; DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND vARFARE, 1 351-
355 (1956). For a detailed discussion of recent development of the international law of host-
state consent, see David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-
State Consent, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 209 (1996).
58. U.N. CHARTER art. 24(1). It is important to note that this delegation of authority does
not derogate from a state's inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 51.
59. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
60. HIGGINS, supra note 48, at 174.
61. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993).
62. Security Council Resolution 940 paragraph 4 provides as follows:
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, [the Security Council]
authorizes Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and
control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure
from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agree-
ment, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of
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the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herze-
govinae and Security Council Resolution 1031 authorized such en-
forcement action by the multinational implementation force (IFOR)
"as may be necessary to ensure implementation of the military as-
pects of the peace settlement and the protection of IFOR."'
An Agenda for Peace preceded Resolution 794 and the historic
operations in Somalia, and thus did not recognize the concept of co-
ercive peace-keeping. The Supplement to An Agenda for Peace,
however, clearly adopts a form of peace-keeping where the Security
Council authorizes Member States to use armed force by deploying a
neutral and impartial military presence in areas of tension or conflict,
not necessarily with the consent of all the parties concerned, for the
purposes of a limited mandate short of stopping an aggressor or im-
posing a cessation of hostilities.0 I refer to this new methodology as
"coercive peace-keeping."
All peace-keepers deployed by the United Nations are author-
ized to use armed force in self-defense, but only coercive peace-
keeping forces are authorized to use force for reasons other than in
self-defense.' Coercive peace-keeping forces begin their operation
as non-belligerents and unlawful targets; however, under existing in-
ternational law, at some undefined point on the spectrum of armed
force, their use of force for reasons other than self-defense makes
them belligerents and lawful targets.
G. Peace-Building
All peace operations must consider their end-state, i.e., that de-
fined point when the operation can be declared successful and the
U.N. presence in the field can be terminated. Critical to the success-
ful termination of any operation is post-conflict "peace-building,"
which is that action taken to "identify and support structures which
the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a
secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Is-
land Agreement ....
S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994).
63. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. S.C. Doc.
S119951999, Annex (1995) [hereinafter Peace Agreement].
64. S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031 (1995).
65. SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 41, paras. 8-22,34-36.
66. See id. paras. 33-36.
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will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and
well-being among people." 7 These actions may include disarma-
ment, demilitarization, refugee repatriation, election monitoring,
economic and social development, and protection of human rights.68
Post-conflict peace-building should occur as an integral part of all
ongoing peace operations, and may be conducted by the military
force in the field, a separate civilian presence, or a joint effort of the
two.
H. Summary of Conflict Management Mechanisms
It should be evident from the brief discussion above that every
level of conflict management-from preventive deployments to tradi-
tional peace-enforcement-may involve the deployment of military
forces. Table 1 summarizes the terminology used by the United Na-
tions as I have refined it to accurately describe the current practice of
the Security Council and the international community. In addition to
understanding the different types of conflict management, one must
also have a clear understanding of the international legal authorities
discussed above under which U.N. peace operations are conducted to
fully understand the following section which discusses the existing le-
gal protections accorded military forces. Accordingly, Table 2 sum-
marizes these legal authorities.
III. EXISTING LEGAL PROTECTIONS ACCORDED
MILITARY FORCES
The status of U.N. or multilateral armed forces depends both on
the underlying authority upon which the forces are present in the re-
ceiving state and on whether the force is non-belligerent or belliger-
ent. This general observation allows us to analyze existing interna-
tional protections accorded military forces operating outside their
flag state in three categories: non-belligerent consensual forces; non-
belligerent forces acting under the coercive authority of the Security
Council; and belligerent forces.
The sovereignty of the receiving state, which includes jurisdic-
tion over its territory that is prima facie exclusive, is the most funda-
mental doctrine of state relations under international law and is the
cardinal consideration in determining the status of military forces op-
67. AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 17, paras. 21,55-59.
68. See id. paras. 55-56.
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erating outside their flag state.69 While the first category above ac-
knowledges the territorial and political sovereignty of the receiving
state, the last two categories recognize exceptions to the general rule
of exclusive sovereignty.
A. Non-Belligerent Consensual Forces
1. Summary of Legal Protections. Non-belligerent consensual
forces deployed in the territory of a sovereign state are fully exposed
to the domestic law and regulation of the receiving state, subject only
to protections provided by a stationing agreement, and those
privileges, immunities, and protections afforded by international law.
This exposure, if not altered by agreement or international law,
includes subjecting members of the force to the full criminal and civil
jurisdiction of the receiving state, as well as exposing the force itself
to receiving state regulation such as import fees, customs, and taxes.
Consequently, it is highly preferred during a consensual deployment
to have an agreement with the receiving state to determine the status
of the members of the force, to ensure that members of the force are
protected by receiving state law, and to exempt the force itself from
unnecessary regulation and expense-notwithstanding that some of
these privileges and immunities are already granted by international
law. Unless additional authorization is granted by the receiving state,
military personnel deploying outside their own state may only use
armed force for self-defense. Non-belligerent consensual forces are
not lawful targets, even though they may be deployed into areas of
ongoing hostilities.
2. Receiving State Law. The peacetime stationing of military
forces on foreign territory did not become general state practice until
the twentieth century, perhaps as a consequence of the evolving
emphasis on collective security. 0 Indeed, prior to 1914, military
forces were generally present on foreign territory only as forces of
hostile or peaceful occupation.71 During a hostile occupation, an
occupied state retained its sovereignty as a matter of law, while
69. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (3d ed. 1979).
70. See JOHN WOODLIFFE, THE PEACETIME USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
UNDER MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (1992).
71. See SERGE LAzAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 7 (1971).
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extensive portions of its governmental authority were displaced by
the occupying military force.' In contrast, during a peaceful
occupation, which historically included only small contingents
present for a short time under exceptional circumstances, the
occupied state retained its full governmental authority'
Consent of the receiving state was required for a peaceful occu-
pation and the rights and obligations of the occupying force were
normally defined by mutual agreement.74 In the absence of an
agreement, an occupying force retained its internal disciplinary
power, but, with the exception of jurisdiction, was otherwise consid-
ered fully subject to the sovereignty of the receiving state.' Propo-
nents of the doctrine of the law of the flag asserted that a military
force operating on foreign territory had exclusive jurisdiction over its
personnel; in practice, however, military personnel participating in a
peaceful occupation were prosecuted and sentenced for offenses
committed outside the performance of their official duty by receiving
states when no jurisdictional agreement existed.76
It was this provisional custom of peaceful occupation that devel-
oped into the practice of a more permanent stationing of forces.' As
this practice developed, consent of the receiving state remained a re-
quirement for the peacetime stationing of foreign forces, and the
conditions of their admission continued to be defined by mutual
agreement." The status of forces stationed in a foreign territory with
a receiving state's consent but without an agreement on the condi-
tions of their admission, however, was a very contentious area of in-
ternational law for a number of years involving the exclusive jurisdic-
tional doctrine of the law of the flag and a restrictive jurisdictional
approach that balanced competing state interests.79 The law and state
practice is now well-established: Absent an express agreement to the
contrary, foreign forces are fully subject to receiving state sovereignty
72. See id. at 7-8; 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 39, arts. 42-43, 36 Stat. 2306, 1 Be-
vans at 651.
73. See LAZAREFF, supra note 71, at 8.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 9.
76. For an excellent summary of the contentious issue of jurisdiction over military forces
in the absence of an agreement, see id. at 11-18.
77. See id. at 8.
78. See WOODLFE, supra note 70, at 35-44.
79. See LAZAREFF, supra note 71, at 11-18; DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-161-1,
THE LAW OF PEACE, VOLUME I, 5-2 to 5-4, 10-3 (1979) [hereinafter DEP'T OF THE ARMY
PAM. 27-161-1].
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and members of the force are fully subject to the jurisdiction of a re-
ceiving state for offenses committed outside the performance of their
official duty.' °
This application of receiving state law can be very problematic
for foreign forces because it includes subjecting the force to receiving
state laws and regulations concerning entry and exit, customs, laws,
and taxation, as well as criminal and civil jurisdiction."' Exposure to
receiving state laws and regulations can have significant adverse op-
erational impact on foreign forces because they govern the daily ac-
tivities of the force, such as the requirements for driver's licenses and
vehicle insurance, the wearing of uniforms, the display of foreign
flags and other national markings, the possession and carrying of
weapons, the use of force, the exercise of military discipline, the ju-
ridical status of the force and its ability to contract for services and
goods, and claims (both contractual and tort) against the foreign
force.s2 Even if not misused, the pervasive nature of receiving state
law and regulations can interfere with the basic functioning of foreign
forces and significantly increase their operational costs. Receiving
state sovereignty does not preempt the inherent right of foreign
forces to defend themselves's and does not preempt the sending state
from using additional forces to protect its own nationals from an im-
minent threat of injury or death when the receiving state is unwilling
or unable to protect them."
80. See LAZAREFF, supra note 71, at 57-58; DEP'T OF THE ARMY PAM. 27-161-1, supra
note 79, 10-3; DEP'T OF THE Am FORCE, PAMPHLET 110-20, SELECTED INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS, p. 2-1 (1981) [hereinafter DEP'T OF THE Am FORCE PAM. 110-20]; BROWNLIE,
supra note 69, at 369.
81. These are the most important areas of concern when addressing the status of foreign
forces and are the most commonly addressed issues in stationing agreements. See, eg., DEP'T
OF THE AIR FORCE PAM. 110-20, supra note 80, at 2-1.
82. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) provides a well-established example of how these and other interests of the receiving
and sending state are balanced. See Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty Regarding the Status of Forces, June 19,1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792,199 U.N.T.S. 67.
83. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51; SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 41,
paras. 33-34, 36; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 589 (Bruno
Simma ed., 1994).
84. See NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 188-90 (John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990). But see
IAN BROWNLm, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 264-80, 431-34
(1963); THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at 124-26,
666 (stating that the forcible protection of nationals against the will of the territorial state is
illegal under U.N. Charter Article 2(4) and does not justify use of self-defense under Article
51).
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While the application of receiving state law can interfere with or
hinder the purpose underlying the stationing of foreign forces, it can
also serve to protect foreign forces. Receiving state criminal law, for
example, is intended to prevent harm to society by protecting indi-
viduals and property within its territory. To the extent that a receiv-
ing state's system of criminal law is effective and enforced, members
of foreign forces are protected from injury and the property of for-
eign forces is protected from damage or theft.
3. Stationing Agreements. Inherent in the authorization to
station forces within a receiving state is the implied authorization
that the foreign forces may exercise those rights and powers that are
necessary for its effective operation; any further rights and powers,
however, must be expressly granted by the receiving state.' The
uncertainty of the breadth of these implied powers and the exclusive
nature of state sovereignty make detailed agreements a fundamental
requirement to clarify the application of receiving state law and
regulation to foreign forces. These agreements can take many forms,
such as a collective defense treaty, a base agreement or lease, a
security assistance sales contract, an international headquarters
agreement, an exchange of diplomatic notes, or an informal
arrangement.
When the rights, privileges, powers, duties, and obligations of a
foreign force are addressed in a separate agreement, it is normally re-
ferred to as a "status of forces agreement" (SOFA).m Key issues that
should be addressed in any SOFA include the exercise of criminal ju-
risdiction over offenses committed by members of the foreign force;
the exercise of civil jurisdiction over acts of the members of the for-
eign force; the settlement of civil claims arising out of the activities of
the force; the allocation of responsibility for security over installa-
tions; passport and visa requirements; freedom of movement for offi-
cial duties; on-site rights and powers; off-site rights, powers, and
authority; rights of overflight; the right to conduct maneuvers and ex-
ercises; and dispute resolution.'
SOFAs may be either bilateral or multilateral, and may be used
to detail the status of U.N. forces. Since a Chapter IV or a Chapter
VI force operates in purely a consensual environment, SOFAs are as
important to a U.N. force as to any national force stationed in a re-
85. See WOODLIUFE, supra note 70, at 146.
86. See LAZAREFF, supra note 71, at 2-3.
87. See WOODLIFFE, supra note 70, at 135-50.
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ceiving state. Accordingly, the United Nations has recognized the
importance of SOFAs since its first consensual peace-keeping force.
In 1957, the United Nations entered into an Exchange of Letters with
Egypt to specify the status of the United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) in Egypt, which was established under the authority of
Chapter IV of the Charter.s This agreement on the status of UNEF
was the first document of its kind to be used by the United Nations.89
Similarly, in 1989, the United Nations entered into an agreement with
South Africa to detail the status of the United Nations Transition As-
sistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, which was established under
the authority of Chapter VI of the Charter."°
It is the established preference of the United Nations to attempt
to work out an agreement on the status of its forces to be deployed
within a receiving state.9' A review of the practice of the United Na-
tions, however, reveals the lack of a specific written agreement for
recent operations.' For intrastate disputes, an agreement may not be
reached because of the dispute within the receiving state over who
has the authority to conclude such an agreement.93 At the request of
the General Assembly, 4 the Secretary-General prepared a model
status of forces agreement to be used by the United Nations and re-
ceiving States.95 The Secretary-General's report stated that the
model status of forces agreement was based upon established prac-
88. Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement Between the United Nations and the
Government of Egypt Concerning the Status of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt,
Feb. 8, 1957, U.N.-Egypt, 260 U.N.T.S. 61, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON UNrrED
NATIONS AND RELATED PEACE-KEEPING FORCEs 7 (Robert C. R. Siekmann ed., 2d ed. 1989)
[hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS].
89. See THE BLUE HELMETS, supra note 50, at 54.
90. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Republic of South Africa Concerning
the Status of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (South West Africa),
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/20412/Add. 1, Mar. 16, 1989, reprinted in BASIC DOcuMENTS, supra
note 88, at 247.
91. See THE BLUE HELMETS, supra note 50, at 87.
92. For a detailed description of the difficulties encountered by UNPROFOR in trying to
conclude workable Status-of-forces Agreements in Yugoslavia, see Christine Gray, Case Study,
Host-State Consent and United Nations Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 241 (1996).
93. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at 598.
94. G.A. Res. 44/49, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 78, U.N. Doc. A1RESI44149
(1989).
95. Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peace-keeping Operations: Report of the Secre-
tary-General, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 76, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (1990) [hereinafter United Na-
tions Model SOFA].
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tice.9' The Office of the Legal Adviser to the United Nations has
concluded in the context of a specific operation that
in the absence of a signed agreement, the status of the United Na-
tions forces and operations in Croatia are governed by the custom-
ary practices and principles applicable to UN peace-keeping or
similar operations as codified in the Model Status-of-forces agree-
ment issued as a General Assembly document dated 9 October
1990 (A/45/594).9'
In 1991, the Secretary-General restated this position in his
Model Agreement Between the United Nations and Member States
Contributing Personnel and Equipment to United Nations Peace-
keeping Operations, which provides in paragraph 6 that, pending the
conclusion of a status of forces agreement, the United Nations "shall
apply the customary principles and practices which are embodied in
the model status-of-forces agreement. 98
This precise language from the model agreement recognizing the
customary international law status of the U.N. Model SOFA was
used in 1994 by the United Nations in making arrangements with
Canada to provide personnel and equipment to the United Nations
Mission in Haiti.9 Although considerably different in format, the
SOFA arrangements concluded as a part of the General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,"° are substantively
consistent with the U.N. Model SOFA. The terms of the model
SOFA, ' and thus customary international law, are limited to opera-
tions established under the authority of the United Nations and con-
ducted under U.N. authority and control."°
96. See id. para. 1.
97. Letter from Ralph Zacklin, Director and Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General for
Legal Affairs, the United Nations, to Robert B. Rosenstock, Minister Counsellor, United
States Mission to the United Nations (Apr. 25, 1995) (on file with the Duke Journal of Com-
parative & International Law).
98. Model Agreement Between the United Nations and Member States Contributing Per-
sonnel and Equipment to United Nations Peace-keeping Operations, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
Annex, at para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/46/185 (1991).
99. Peacekeeping Services Contract Negotiated Between the Government of Canada and
the United Nations (Nov. 30, 1994) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & Interna-
tional Law) (agreement between the United Nations and Canada regarding the provision of
military personnel and equipment to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)).
100. Peace Agreement, supra note 63.
101. United Nations Model SOFA, supra note 95, §§ I-IlI.
102. This formula of application is parallel to the definition of "United Nations operations"
as adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the Safety Convention, supra
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Section 3 of the U.N. Model SOFA provides that the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (Privileges
and Immunities Convention) 3 applies to the U.N. peace-keeping op-
eration, subject to the provisions of the model agreement. For exam-
ple, the Privileges and Immunities Convention provides for varying
levels of privileges and immunities for the representatives of Mem-
bers, officials of the United Nations, the Secretary-General and As-
sistant Secretaries-General, and experts on mission.' The U.N.
Model SOFA grants military observers "experts on mission" status,
the Commander of the force the protections of a diplomatic envoy
accorded the Secretary-General, and members of the force the more
limited privileges and immunities as detailed in the model agree-
ment."-' Members of the force are immune from criminal and civil ju-
risdiction for all acts performed in their official capacity; exempt
from all income taxes except on income received from sources inside
the receiving state; exempt from all other direct taxes, registration
fees or charges; and, exempt from those laws and regulations gov-
erning customs and foreign exchange for personal property required
by reason of their presence in the receiving state."6 Additionally, the
model SOFA contains detailed provisions commonly found in a
status agreement such as the use of the U.N. flag, wearing of uni-
forms, carrying of weapons, use of force, arrest and detention powers
of the force, vehicle markings, use of U.N. issued drivers licenses,
communications capabilities, postal services, freedom of movement,
designation and protection of facilities, cost of utility services, local
contracting, hiring of local personnel, currency exchange rates, entry
and departure requirements, required identity documents, and dis-
pute settlement provisions.'
4. The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two 1977
Geneva Protocols. World War II highlighted the lack of preciseness
and clarity of those existing laws of armed conflict that protected
victims of war and the need for more specific provisions on punishing
note 16, art. 1.
103. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946,21
U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities Convention].
104. The Privileges and Immunities Convention will be discussed in more detail infra Part
III.A.7.
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violations of the law."8 The laws of armed conflict, jus in bello, are
those rules that govern the actual conduct of hostilities regardless of
whether the conflict is lawful or unlawful in its inception under the
rules that govern the resort to armed conflict, jus ad bellum.19 At the
initiative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
four conventions were drafted that adapted and developed the laws
of armed conflict, resulting in the four Geneva Conventions of
1949."' These four conventions apply during international armed
conflict, and deal with the following four categories of victims of war,
respectively: wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; wounded,
sick and ship-wrecked in armed forces at sea; prisoners of war; and
civilians.' The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are adhered to by
more states than any other agreements on the laws of armed conflict
and are declaratory of customary international law."'
These conventions are linked by certain general principles and
by common articles that are found throughout each of the four con-
ventions. 3 Common Article 2 governs the application of the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949, and is widely accepted as the threshold
test for when an international armed conflict exists."4 This article in-
vokes the provisions of the Conventions, and the application of the
laws of armed conflict, upon the declaration of war or the occurrence
of de facto hostilities." The commentary of the 1949 Geneva Con-
108. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 169 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds.,
2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter LAWS OF WAR].
109. See id. at 2-3.
110. See id. at 169. Collectively, these four conventions are referred to as the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949. Individual citations are as follows: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217,75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,1949,6 U.S.T. 3516,75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention IV].
111. See LAWS OF WAR, supra note 108, at 169.
112. See id. at 169-70. As ofmid-1995, 185 countries were member states of the four 1949
Geneva Conventions. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949 AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977: RATIFICATIONS, ACCESSIONS
AND SUCCESSIONS AS AT30 JUNE 1995, at 7 (July 6,1995).
113. See LAWS OF WAR, supra note 108, at 169.
114. See id. at 169-70; COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 17-21 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958)
[hereinafter 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION IV COMMENTARY].
115. See 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION IV COMMENTARY, supra note 114, at20.
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vention IV published by the ICRC explains that
[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the in-
tervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict
within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies
the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the
conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place.11
This threshold for the application of the Conventions was intended to
afford maximum protection to belligerents and non-belligerents by
ensuring the Conventions applied to as many interactions between
the armed forces of states as possible."7
As the first international agreement in the laws of armed conflict
to exclusively address the protection of civilians, the Geneva Conven-
tion IV made a substantial contribution to international law.' Gen-
erally, protected persons under this Convention
are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their
honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices,
and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be hu-
manely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of
violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curios-
ity.1
9
Members of the armed forces of parties to an international
armed conflict who violate the provisions of the four Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 are subject to criminal prosecution.'m
Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV specifies who are
protected persons under this Convention. This article provides that
[p]ersons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a
conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Oc-
cupying Power of which they are not nationals.
Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not
protected by it. Nationals of a neutral state who find themselves in
the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent
116. Id.
117. See id. at 17-21.
118. See LAWS OF WAR, supra note 108, at 271-72.
119. 1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 110, art. 27, 6 U.S.T at 3536, 75 U.N.T.S. at
306.
120. See id. art. 146,6 U.S.T at 3616,75 U.N.T.S. at 386.
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state, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of
which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the
State in whose hands they are.
The provisions of Part II [the general protection of populations
against certain consequences of war] are, however, wider in appli-
cation, as defined in Article 13. .
Persons protected by the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field of August 12, 1949, or by the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, or by the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
of August 12, 1949, shall not be considered as protected persons
within the meaning of the present Convention. '
The provisions of the four Geneva Conventions do not explicitly
address their application to the armed forces of states not a party to
the conflict, i.e., neutral states, that are located in the area of hostili-
ties. The 1949 Geneva Convention IV Commentary, however, pro-
vides that the language "at a given moment and in any manner what-
soever" was intended to ensure that all situations and cases were
covered, and that the expression "in the hands of' is used in a general
sense to include all persons in the territory under the control of a
party to the conflict that are not nationals of that party.1 " Article 4
was intended to cover everyone in the hands of a state party to a con-
flict who is not a national of that state.1 3 The exception in paragraph
2 of Article 4 for the nationals of neutral states applies only "in the
territory of a belligerent State" and only "while the State of which
they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation" with the
belligerent state.124 In the case of this exception, neutrals are pro-
tected by other applications 'of the legal regime that protects military
forces operating outside their flag state.'2
In the conclusion to its discussion of Article 4, the 1949 Geneva
Convention IV Commentary states that
[I]n short, all the particular cases we have just been considering
confirm a general principle which is embodied in all four Geneva
Conventions of 1949. Every person in enemy hands must have
121. Id. art. 4,6 U.S.T at 3520,75 U.N.T.S. at 290 (emphasis added).
122. 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION IV COMMENTARY, supra note 114, at 46-47.
123. See id. at 46.
124. Id. at 48-49.
125. See id. at 49.
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some status under international law: he is either a prisoner of war
and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a civilian covered
by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical per-
sonnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention.
There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be out-
side the law."2
Accordingly, the armed forces of states not a party to the conflict op-
erating in areas of armed conflict are protected persons under the
1949 Geneva Convention IV and are not lawful targets.
This protection accorded the armed forces of neutral states is not
only reinforced but clarified by the protocols to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949."z These two Geneva Protocols of 1977 were in-
tended to adapt the laws of armed conflict to the conditions of mod-
ern hostilities and to broaden the protections accorded the victims of
armed conflicts."2 Members of the armed forces of parties to an in-
ternational armed conflict who violate the provisions of the two Ge-
neva Protocols of 1977 are also subject to criminal prosecution.29
Protocol I supplements the protections accorded victims of in-
ternational armed conflicts provided by the four Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 and applies in situations referred to in common Article
2.'- The first two paragraphs of Article 75 of Protocol I provide that:
1. In so far as they are affected by a situation referred to in Article
1 of this Protocol [international armed conflicts], persons who are in
the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from
more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under this
Protocol shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall
enjoy, as a minimum, the protection provided by this Article ....
Each Party shall respect the person, honour, convictions and relig-
ious practices of all such persons.
2. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
126. Id. at 51.
127. Collectively, these two conventions are referred to as the Geneva Protocols of 1977.
As of November, 1996, the United States is not a party to these two Conventions. Individual
citations are as follows: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977,1125 U.N.T.S. 609,16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol
1n].
128. See LAWS OF WAR, supra note 108, at 387.
129. See Protocol I, supra note 127, arts. 85-87,1125 U.N.T.S. at 41-43,16 I.L.M. at 1427-29.
130. Id. art. 1(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7,16 I.L.M. at 1397.
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and in any place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by
military agents:
(a) violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-
being of persons, in particular:
(i) murder;
(ii) torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental;
(iii) corporal punishment; and
(iv) mutilation;
(b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form
of indecent assault;
(c) the taking of hostages;
(d) collective punishments; and
(e) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts."'
This article clearly broadens the protections of Article 4 of the 1949
Geneva Convention IV by granting the protections of Article 75 to
all persons who "are in the power of a Party to the conflict and do not
benefit from more favourable treatment" under the four 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions or Protocol J.132
Additionally, Protocol I specifically recognizes that the United
Nations has a protected status. Article 37 makes "the feigning of
protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the
United Nations or of neutral or other states not Parties to the con-
flict" an unlawful act of perfidy.33 Similarly, Article 38 places the
United Nations in the same category as other internationally pro-
tected organizations that are not lawful objects of attack unless being
misused for hostile purposes."3 Article 38 makes the distinctive em-
blem of the United Nations an internationally protected emblem by
providing that:
131. Id. art. 75(1)-(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25,16 I.L.M. at 1423 (emphasis added).
132. Accord MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:
COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOcOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 1949, 457-58 (1982).
133. "Unlawful acts of perfidy" are defined in paragraph 1 of Article 37 as those acts
"inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is
obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict,
with intent to betray that confidence." Protocol I, supra note 127, art. 37(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at
21,16 I.L.M. at 1409.
134. For a thorough discussion of the law of targeting, see chapter eight of DEP'T OF THE
NAVY, NWP 1-14M, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
(1995) [hereinafter COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK].
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1. It is prohibited to make improper use of the distinctive emblem
of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other em-
blems, signs or signals provided for by the conventions or by this
Protocol. It is also prohibited to misuse deliberately in an armed
conflict other internationally recognized protective emblems, signs
or signals, including the flag of truce, and the protective emblem of
cultural property.
2. It is prohibited to make use of the distinctive emblem of the
United Nations, except as authorized by that Organization. 35
It is important to note, however, that the report of the drafting
Committee for Articles 37 and 38 limits the protected status of the
United Nations to those situations where the U.N. forces are not bel-
ligerents engaged in an enforcement action involving armed com-
bat.136 During these situations when U.N. forces are belligerents, ex-
isting international law governing the use of U.N. signs, emblems,
and uniforms places the United Nations on equal footing with any
other belligerent party to the conflict."
5. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The
ICRC was faced with almost universal opposition to its proposal that
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 would apply to all conflicts,
international and internal.m The resulting compromise was common
Article 3, the only article in the Conventions that applies to a non-
international armed conflict until such time that the parties to the
conflict invoke, by special agreement, all or part of the other
provisions of the Conventions.' Common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Convention IV provides that
[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an international character oc-
curring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including mem-
bers of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any
135. Protocol I, supra note 127, art. 38,1125 U.N.T.S. at 22,16 I.L.M. at 1409.
136. SeeBOTHEETAL, supra note 132, at 206-11.
137. See id. at 206.
138. See 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION IV COMMENTARY, supra note 114, at 26-32.
139. See id. at 34.
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adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex,
birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the fol-
lowing acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity; in particular, humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly consti-
tuted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are rec-
ognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and the sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the
conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to
bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the
other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the
preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties
to the conflict.14
The language of this article is clear and absolute: "Persons taking
no active part in the hostilities. . shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely .. .,."' Common Article 3 grants the enumerated
protections to U.N. military forces.
Protocol II develops and supplements common Article 3 and its
protections accorded victims of all armed conflicts that are not cov-
ered by Protocol .142 Article 4 of Protocol II uses the same clear and
absolute formula for defining protected persons as all "persons who
do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostili-
ties, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to
respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious prac-
tices ... [and] shall in all circumstances be treated humanely."' 43
According to their own terms, however, common Article 3 and
Protocol II limit the protected status of the United Nations to those
situations where the United Nations forces are taking no active part
in the hostilities, in other words, where they are not belligerents en-
140. 1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 110, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. at
288 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Protocol II, supra note 127, art. 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611,16 I.L.M. at 1443.
143. Id. art. 4,1125 U.N.T.S. at 612,16 I.L.M. at 1444.
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gaged in an enforcement action involving armed combat. During
those situations when U.N. forces are belligerents, existing interna-
tional law governing the rights and obligations of U.N. military forces
places the United Nations on equal footing with any other belligerent
party to the conflict.
6. Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 105 of
the Charter provides that the United Nations "shall enjoy in the
territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes" and similar privileges
and immunities for representatives of the United Nations "as are
necessary for the independent exercise of their functions."' 44 This
article established the principle of functional necessity of privileges
and immunities that balances the conflicting interests of the United
Nations and the receiving state. 45 This principle of functional
necessity has become a fundamental rule and is reflected throughout
the international system of privileges and immunities.'"
Section 467 of the Third Restatement of the Law: The Foreign
Relations Law of the United States is also based on Article 105 of the
Charter. 7 It provides that under "international law, an international
organization generally enjoys such privileges and immunities from
the jurisdiction of a member state as are necessary for the fulfilment
of the purposes of the organization, including immunity from legal
process, and from financial controls, taxes, and duties."'" With re-
spect to the United Nations, the legal counsel to the United Nations
and the Third Restatement conclude that these privileges and immu-
nities also apply to nonmember states as a matter of customary inter-
national law.49
7. The Privileges and Immunities Convention. The Privileges and
Immunities Convention was the result of the General Assembly's
144. U.N. CHARTER art. 105.
145. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at
1139.
146. See id.
147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 467
cmt. b (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
148. Id. § 467.
149. Annual Report of the Secretary-General, 208-209,23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 1 (1968);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 147, § 467 cmt. a.
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efforts to detail the general protections afforded by Article 105.'
The provisions of the Privileges and Immunities Convention have
reached such universal acceptance that they are now considered
customary international law. 5' The Privileges and Immunities
Convention creates a system of absolute immunity for the property,
funds, and assets of the United Nations that has never been a matter
of dispute. 2 Sections 2 through 4 of the Privileges and Immunities
Convention provide:
Section 2. The United Nations, its property and assets wherever lo-
cated and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every
form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has
expressly waived its immunity. It is, however, understood that no
waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.
Section 3. The premises of the United Nations shall be inviolable.
The property and assets of the United Nations, wherever located
and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition,
confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference,
whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action.
Section 4. The archives of the United Nations, and in general all
documents belonging to it or held by it, shall be inviolable wherever
located.1 3
Additionally, section 5 exempts U.N. financial holdings from re-
ceiving state controls, regulations or moratoria of any kind, and sec-
tion 7 exempts the United Nations, its assets, income and other prop-
erty from taxes, customs duties, as well as import and export
prohibitions and restrictions of receiving states. Immunity from in-
terference by receiving states is required to ensure the independent
action of the United Nations. Accordingly, the property, funds, and
assets of military forces acting under the direction of the Security
Council, as a subsidiary entity of the United Nations, enjoy absolute
immunity as provided by the Privileges and Immunities Convention.
Consistent with the principle of functional necessity, the privi-
leges and immunities for personnel within a U.N. military force var-
ies depending upon their assigned position. The Privileges and Im-
munities Convention establishes four levels of privileges and
150. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at
1138.
151. See id.
152- See id. at 1140.
153. Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 103, §§ 2-4, 21 U.S.T. at 1422, 1
U.N.T.S. at 16-18 (emphasis added).
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immunities: representatives of Members, officials of the United Na-
tions, the Secretary-General and Assistant Secretaries-General, and
experts on mission.'- Since the U.N. Model SOFA reflects custom-
ary international law, two of these levels of protection are relevant to
military forces. The U.N. Model SOFA grants military observers ex-
perts on mission status and the Commander of the force the protec-
tions of a diplomatic envoy accorded the Secretary-General. l"5
The status of experts on mission accords military observers "such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exer-
cise of their functions," makes them immune from arrest or deten-
tion, and immune from "legal process of every kind" during the
course of their official duties. " Additionally, as an ad hoc arrange-
ment, personnel operating under a U.N. mandate are sometimes
specified by the Secretary-General to be "experts on mission" under
the Privileges and Immunities Convention. For example, United
States aircrews that flew missions in support of the United Nations
Protective Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia were re-
garded as experts on mission for the United Nations." Similarly, the
technical experts that provided integrated logistics support to the
Rapid Reaction Force of UNPROFOR were also regarded as experts
on mission."
The military commander of the force is accorded those privileges
and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic envoys under international
law, ' principally the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations."o
A diplomatic envoy is not subject to any form of arrest or detention
and enjoys complete immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the
154. Id. §§ 11,18,19,22,21 U.S.T. at 1426,1432,1432,1 U.N.T.S. at 20,24,26.
155. United Nations Model SOFA, supra note 95, §§ 24-26.
156. Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 103, § 22, 21 U.S.T at 1434, 1
U.N.T.S. at 26.
157. See Letter from Ralph Zacklin, Director and Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General
for Legal Affairs, the United Nations, to Robert B. Rosenstock, Minister Counsellor, United
States Mission to the United Nations (Mar. 4, 1994) (on file with the Duke Journal of Com-
parative & International Law).
158. See Letter from Ralph Zacklin, Director and Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General
for Legal Affairs, the United Nations, to Carolyn Wilson, Counsellor, United States Mission to
the United Nations (July 12, 1995) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & Interna-
tional Law).
159. See Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 103, § 19, 21 U.S.T. at 1432, 1
U.N.T.S. at 24.
160. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 95.
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receiving state. ' An envoy also enjoys immunity from the civil and
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of
actions relating to private immovable property situated within the re-
ceiving state, to succession when the envoy is either an executor, ad-
ministrator, or heir, or to any professional or commercial activity
outside the envoy's official functions. '62
8. United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The Security
Council has taken action on a number of occasions to ensure the
security and safety of U.N. forces. Somalia is an excellent case study
in this regard. Early in 1992, in preparation for an increased U.N.
presence in Somalia, paragraph 8 of Resolution 733 urged "all parties
to take all the necessary measures to ensure the safety of personnel
sent to provide humanitarian assistance, to assist them in their tasks
and to ensure full respect for the rules and principles of international
law regarding the protection of civilian populations."',, Similarly,
when technical teams were dispatched to Somalia'" and a security
force was deployed as United Nations Operations in Somalia
(UNOSOM),'" the Security Council urged all parties to respect the
security and safety of U.N. and humanitarian personnel. When
UNOSOM failed, the Security Council authorized Chapter VII
operations in Somalia under the command and control of the United
States (Operation Restore Hope), and used its coercive authority to
demand "that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all
measures necessary to ensure the safety of U.N. and all other
personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance,
including the military forces.. ." and affirmed that individuals will be
held accountable for all violations of international humanitarian
law.16
In Resolution 814, the Security Council established the Ex-
panded United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) to
continue humanitarian assistance after Operation Restore Hope, and
again used its coercive authority to demand that "all Somali parties,
including movements and factions, take all measures to ensure the
161. See id. §§ 29,31,23 U.S.T at 3240-41,500 U.N.T.S at 110,112.
162. See id. § 31,23 U.S.T. at 3240-3241, 500 U.N.T.S. at 112.
163. S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th mtg., para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733
(1992).
164. See S.C. Res. 746, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3060th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRESI746 (1992).
165. See S.C. Res. 751, supra note 52.
166. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 55.
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safety of the personnel of the United Nations and its agencies as well
as the staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross, inter-
governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations."'67
On June 5, 1993, a series of armed attacks against UNOSOM II left
twenty-four dead and fifty-seven injured.1 6' In response, the Security
Council reaffirmed the Secretary-General's authority under Resolu-
tion 814 "to take all measures necessary against all those responsible
for the armed attacks... [and] to secure the investigation of their ac-
tions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and pun-
ishment."'69
Somali attacks on UNOSOM II forces continued over the next
few months as UNOSOM II forces increased military operations for
the capture of the warlord believed responsible for the June 5 at-
tacks."' The intensity of the hostilities peaked on October 3, 1993,
when one Malaysian and eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed, and an-
other nine Malaysian, three Pakistani, and seventy-eight U.S. soldiers
were wounded.' On November 16, 1993, the Security Council
authorized the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to investi-
gate the armed attacks on UNOSOM II and requested the Secretary-
General to suspend arrest actions against those individuals who
might be implicated in the attacks." The Security Council noted that
the members of the Commission would have the status of experts on
mission within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Conven-
tion.'
On March 31, 1993, before the attacks on UNOSOM II began,
the Security Council requested the Secretary-General
to report as soon as possible on the existing arrangements for the
protection of United Nations forces and personnel, and the ade-
quacy thereof, taking into account, inter alia, relevant multilateral
instruments and status of forces agreements concluded between the
United Nations and host countries, as well as comments he may re-
167. S.C. Res. 814, supra note 61.
168. See Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Resolution 885 (1993)
to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to Casualties Among Them,
para. 117, U.N. Doc. S/1994/653 (1994), [hereinafter Report of the Commission], reprinted in
THE UNrrED NATiONs AND SOMALiA, supra note 41, at 368, 376.
169. S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (1993).
170. See Report of the Commission, supra note 168, paras. 125-73.
171. See id. para. 173.
172. See S.C. Res. 885,48th Sess., U.N. SCOR 3315th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/885 (1993).
173. Seeid
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ceive from member States, and to make such recommendations as
he considers appropriate for enhancing the safety and security of
United Nations forces and personnel.' 74
In response to the Secretary-General's report,75 the Security
Council passed Resolution 868 which states:
The Security Council,...
Recalling the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations con-
cerning privileges and immunities and the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, as applicable to
United Nations operations and persons engaged in such operations,
Expressing grave concern at the increasing number of attacks and
use of force against persons engaged in United Nations operations,
and resolutely condemning all such actions ....
3. Urges States and parties to a conflict to cooperate closely with
the United Nations to ensure the security and safety of United Na-
tions forces and personnel;
4. Confirms that attacks and the use of force against persons en-
gaged in a United Nations operation authorized by the Security
Council will be considered interference with the exercise of the re-
sponsibilities of the Council and may require the Council to con-
sider measures it deems appropriate;
5. Confirms also that if, in the view of the Council, the host country
is unable or unwilling to meet its obligations with regard to the
safety and security of a United Nations operation and personnel
engaged in the operation, the Council will consider what steps
should be taken appropriate to the situation;
6. Determines that, when considering the establishment of future
United Nations operations authorized by the Council, the Council
will require, inter alia:
(a) That the host country take all appropriate steps to ensure
the security and safety of the operation and personnel engaged
in the operation;
(b) That the security and safety arrangements undertaken by
the host country extend to all persons engaged in the opera-
tion;
(c) That an agreement on the status of the operation and all
personnel engaged in the operation in the host country be ne-
gotiated expeditiously and come into force as near as possible
174. Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/25493 (1993), reprinted in AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 17, at 134.
175. Security of United Nations Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., U.N. Doc. $/26358 (1993).
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to the outset of the operation;
7. Requests the Secretary-General, when recommending the estab-
lishment or renewal of a United Nations Operation by the Security
Council, to take into account the provisions of the present resolu-
tion;
8. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 76
As the examples above indicate, the practice of the Security
Council has been to take preventive measures, such as requesting the
Secretary-General to ensure a status agreement is in place or calling
upon parties to ensure protection. The Security Council has also
adopted resolutions condemning past behavior. Rarely has the Secu-
rity Council specifically noted the status of personnel, as it did in the
case of the members of the Commission of Inquiry,'7 and never has it
declared the status of a U.N. force under its coercive authority.
B. Non-Belligerent Forces Acting Under the Coercive Authority of
the Security Council
1. Summary of Legal Protections. Non-belligerent forces acting
under the coercive authority of the Security Council that conduct a
coercive peace-keeping operation in the territory of a sovereign state
have absolute immunity to the extent necessary for the independent
exercise of their mandate as a matter of law from any receiving state
authority against which the Security Council has taken coercive
action. It is nevertheless desirable, to the extent possible, to provide
for the status of the forces by agreement with the receiving state in
order to ensure its cooperation. This arrangement allows a receiving
state to become an active participant in the peace process sought by a
coercive peace-keeping operation that is not prepared to completely
enforce its mandate on the parties to the conflict.
In practice, cooperation remains essential in the typical coercive
peace-keeping scenario because the Security Council's Chapter VII
coercive authority is being used only to overcome the lack of com-
plete agreement and consent by all of the parties. Some form of an
arrangement is vitally important if a coercive peace-keeping force is
not manned and equipped adequately enough to protect itself with-
out some level of cooperation from the receiving state. Military per-
176. S.C. Res. 868, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3283d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/868 (1993).
177. See S.C. Res. 885, supra note 172.
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sonnel participating in coercive peace-keeping operations may use
armed force for self-defense and in accordance with their mandate to
accomplish their mission. Under existing international law they are
not lawful targets as long as they remain non-belligerents, even
though they may be deployed into areas of ongoing hostilities.
2. Absolute Immunity for Chapter VII Forces. The previous
section on non-belligerent consensual forces discussed the
protections accorded military forces operating outside their flag state
derived from receiving state law, the four Geneva Conventions of
1949, the two Geneva Protocols of 1977, applicable Security Council
resolutions, and the general privileges and immunities accorded
forces acting under the direction of the United Nations. Above and
beyond these protections, this section discusses the principle that
Chapter VII coercive forces enjoy and may assert absolute immunity
to the extent necessary for the independent exercise of its mandate
from any receiving state authority against which the Security Council
has taken coercive action. As previously discussed, various forms of
absolute and limited immunity for the United Nations have been
explicitly recognized by the Privileges and Immunities Convention
since 1946 and have never been a matter of dispute."8 For
convenience, Table 3 summarizes the preceding discussions of the
customary international law protections accorded a U.N. military
force that is acting under the direction of the Security Council, i.e., a
force established under the authority of the United Nations and
conducted under U.N. authority and control.
It is important to reemphasize that these privileges and immuni-
ties from receiving State sovereignty only devolve to U.N. forces that
are a subsidiary organ of the United Nations because they are acting
under the direction of the Security Council (such as UNOSOM and
UNOSOM II). They do not apply to those unilateral or multilateral
forces simply acting under the authority of the United Nations (such
as UNITAF).
Absolute immunity for all U.N. forces conducting peace opera-
tions, both directed and authorized, can be derived, however, from
the coercive authority of the Security Council and its implied powers.
178. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNrrED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at
1140.
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By means of Article 25 of the Charter, Member States have agreed
"to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council."19
The drafters of the Charter viewed this coercive decision-making
authority of the Security Council as indispensable for the effective
functioning of the United Nations in the field of maintaining interna-
tional peace and security, and considered this authority the core ele-
ment of the concept of the United Nations."8 Given the central im-
portance of the coercive authority of the Security Council in the field
of maintaining international peace and security, Article 105 must be
read to grant the Security Council, its subsidiary organs, and their
constituent personnel, such privileges and immunities as are neces-
sary to fulfill the purposes of the Security Council when acting under
Chapter VII to maintain international peace and security, and as are
necessary for the personnel of a U.N. force to independently exercise
their functions. To infer otherwise would vitiate the Security Coun-
cil's coercive authority and make it unable to act with the consent of
the receiving state.
The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) has ruled in an advi-
sory opinion that under "international law, the Organization [United
Nations] must be deemed to have those powers which, though not
expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary
implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.' '..
The I.C.J. reasoned as follows:
This principle of law was applied by the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice to the International Labour Organization... and
must be applied to the United Nations .... Having regard to its
purposes and functions already referred to, the Organization may
find it necessary, and has in fact found it necessary, to entrust its
agents with important missions to be performed in disturbed parts
of the world. Many missions, from their very nature, involve the
agents in unusual dangers to which ordinary persons are not ex-
posed .... Both to ensure the efficient and independent perform-
ance of these missions and to afford effective support to its agents,
the Organization must provide them with adequate protection.
This need of protection for the agents of the Organization, as a
condition of the performance of its functions, has already been re-
179. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
180. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNrrED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at 408-
09.
181. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory
Opinion), 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11), excerpts reprinted in CASES ON UNrrED NATIONS LAW 33,
39 (Louis B. Sohn ed., 2d ed. 1967).
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alized, and.., was the unanimous view of the General Assembly.'
1
While this case concerned the capacity of the United Nations to bring
an international claim against a state that had caused an injury to an
agent of the United Nations, it is an application of the principle of
implied powers. This principle was also used as authority in a second
I.C.J. case holding that the United Nations could require its Member
States to contribute to its peace-keeping expenses."s Similarly, a par-
allel application of this principle is the requirement that a Chapter
VII coercive force operating without the consent of a receiving state
must have such privileges and immunities as are necessary to prevent
receiving state interference with the effective functioning of the
force.
Additionally, if Article 105 of the Charter is universally imple-
mented by the Privileges and Immunities Convention and customary
international law to grant absolute immunity for the property, funds,
and assets of the United Nations so as to ensure the United Nations
can act independently when present in a receiving state with its full
consent and cooperation, it is even more compelling that a U.N. force
present in a receiving state without its consent have absolute immu-
nity. This form of absolute immunity for a U.N. force is limited,
however, to the extent necessary for the independent exercise of its
mandate and only with respect to those receiving states against which
the Security Council has taken coercive action.
Non-belligerent forces acting under the coercive authority of the
Security Council have the right to use armed force in sef-defense.'g,
The Security Council may also invoke its powers under Chapter VII
to authorize the use of armed force to accomplish the mandate of the
force."H The first explicit assertion of this authority for non-
belligerent forces was Security Council Resolution 794, authorizing
the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a se-
cure environment for humanitarian relief of operations in Somalia."1"
Under existing international law, non-belligerent forces acting under
182. Id.
183. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion), 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July
20), excerpts reprinted in CASES ON UNrTED NATIONS LAw, supra note 181, at 763,787-790.
184. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51; SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 41,
paras. 33-34, 36; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at
589.
185. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 25,39,42.
186. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 55.
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the authority of the Security Council remain unlawful targets until
their use of force meets the de facto test of common Article 2 of the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949, at which time they become bellig-
erents and lawful targets.'"
C. Belligerent Forces
1. Summary of Legal Protections. Belligerent forces, whether
they operate unilaterally, multilaterally, or under Chapter VII of the
Charter, are governed by the laws of armed conflict. Under these
laws, belligerent forces are authorized to use force in self-defense and
as required for the complete or partial submission of the enemy.'
Even though they are protected by the laws of armed conflict,
belligerent forces may be lawfully targeted by enemy forces.
2. The Laws of Armed Conflict. The laws of armed conflict, jus
in bello, govern the actual conduct of hostilities and have developed
as customary international law through the practice of almost all
societies over thousands of years-from the era of the Greeks and
Romans to the Middle Ages and the twentieth century."9 The
practice of codifying the laws of armed conflict in binding
international agreements did not begin until the nineteenth century
with the 1856 Paris Declaration on Maritime War.' Codification
accelerated at the turn of the century, and the laws of armed conflict
have generally developed in two regimes: the Hague regulations
governing the means and methods of warfare, and the Geneva
Conventions governing the protection of victims of war. 9' Despite
the proliferation of written agreements, the laws of armed conflict
continue to exist independently as customary international law.'1
The laws of armed conflict are separate and distinct from the
body of law known as jus ad bellum, or the rules governing the resort
to armed conflict.'3 Jus in bello applies to all parties of an armed
187. See supra text accompanying notes 114-117.
188. See COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 134, para. 5.2 (stating that the principle of
military necessity allows "[o]nly that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the
law of armed conflict, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with a
minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources").
189. See LAWS OF WAR, supra note 108, at 1-2.
190. See id. at 2-3.
191. See generally id.
192. See id. at 4.
193. See id. at 1.
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conflict regardless of whether the conflict is lawful or unlawful in its
inception under jus ad bellum."' Until the early 1900s, states were
free to resort to war at any time and their freedom to do so was ex-
pressly recognized in international agreements.195 The first restric-
tions on the freedom to resort to war began with the Hague Peace
Conferences of 1899 and 1907, but no arrangement explicitly made
the aggressive use of force unlawful until the Charter of the United
Nations in 1945.196 Articles 2(4), 39, and 51 of the Charter now codify
contemporary jus ad bellum in its entirety.'"
The laws of armed conflict evolved as obligations on states, and
each state remains responsible for the application of the laws of
armed conflict when its forces serve as belligerents under the author-
ity of the United Nations. 9 While belligerents are lawful targets, the
most fundamental tenet of the laws of armed conflict is that the right
of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlim-
ited.1 From this tenet, customary international law derives two cor-
ollary principles: proportionality which seeks to establish criteria for
limiting the use of force, and discrimination, which governs the selec-
tion of methods, weaponry, and targets.m
Since the laws of armed conflict impose reciprocal obligations on
all parties to a conflict, they protect all belligerent military forces.
For example, belligerents who are hors de combat must be respected
and protected by enemy forces? ' and belligerents who fall into enemy
hands are protected by the detailed provisions of the 1949 Geneva
Convention Ill.
D. Summary of Legal Protections Accorded Military Forces
The protections for non-belligerent forces are not mutually ex-
clusive. In any given situation a combination of arrangements may
provide varying levels of force protection. For example, a consensual
194. See id.
195. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNrrED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at 109.
196. See id. at 109-11.
197. See id. at 111.
19. See id. at 600; Conditions of Application of Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to
Hostilities in which United Nations Forces may be engaged (Sept. 3, 1971), reprinted in LAWS
OF WAR, supra note 108, at 372.
199. See LAWS OF WAR, supra note 108, at 4.
200. See id. at 5.
201. See, eg., 1949 Geneva Convention I, supra note 110, art. 12, 6 U.S.T. at 3122, 75
U.N.T.S. at 38.
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peace-keeping force may have minimum protections under the
Privileges and Immunities Convention and have additional protec-
tions under a status of forces agreement. Similarly, a coercive peace-
keeping force may have protections under a status of forces agree-
ment even though it has absolute immunity.
Additionally, multilateral conventions that have recognized the
need for special status and protection for members of a U.N. force
may be applicable. For example, Article 8 of Protocol II to the Con-
vention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Con-
ventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects" seeks to protect U.N. forces and
missions from the effects of minefields, mines, and booby-traps. Ar-
ticle 8 provides as follows:
1. When a United Nations force or mission performs functions of
peace-keeping, observation or similar functions in any area, each
party to the conflict shall, if requested by the head of the United
Nations force or mission in that area, as far as it is able:
(a) remove or render harmless all mines or booby-traps in that
area;
(b) take such measures as may be necessary to protect the
force or mission from the effects of minefields, mines and
booby-traps while carrying out its duties; and
(c) make available to the head of the United Nations force or
mission in that area, all information in the party's possession
concerning the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps
in that area.
2. When a United Nations fact-finding force or mission performs
functions in any area, any party to the conflict concerned shall pro-
vide protection to that mission except where, because of the size of
such mission, it cannot adequately provide such protection. In that
case it shall make available to the head of the mission the informa-
tion in its possession concerning the location of minefields, mines
and booby-traps in that area.2
It is also important to note that the entire range of legal protec-
tions may not be available or effective. As in Somalia, host nation
law may not even exist, or, as in Haiti, the host nation may not be
willing or able to enforce its own laws. Table 4 summarizes the ex-
202. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Protocol II, Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137,168, 19 I.L.M. 1523, 1529 (1980).
203. Id. art. 8.
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isting international legal protections accorded military forces oper-
ating outside their flag state.
IV. THE CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF U.N. AND
ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL
Fundamental principles of sovereignty would seem to dictate
that those accused of attacks on U.N. forces should be prosecuted by
the courts of the state where the attacks occurred as violations of na-
tional law. However, in the politically unstable territories where
U.N. peace operations are most likely to occur-places like Somalia,
Rwanda, Haiti, Burundi, Liberia, and Yugoslavia-prosecution by
local national authorities is not an effective means of ensuring that a
thorough investigation is conducted or that the accused are brought
to justice. Moreover, during a peace operation conducted under the
coercive authority of the Security Council, there is no reason to ex-
pect a local government to cooperate.
Another approach would be to prosecute those accused of at-
tacks on U.N. forces for violations of international norms, such as the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 or the two Geneva Protocols of
1977. Unfortunately, the lack of an institutionalized international
criminal court and the lack of political will and determination to en-
force those international norms is an inertia seldom overcome.
While options run short, relief workers and military forces continue
to die needlessly in the service of the international community and
those who attack them run free without fear of prosecution. No-
where was the increase in gratuitous violence against relief workers
and U.N. forces more rampant than during the three U.N. directed
and authorized operations in Somalia-a land ruled only by anarchy
where life had no value.
A. Evolution of the Safety Convention
The systemic weakness of the protections afforded U.N. forces
by existing international law is that the international community is
unable to rely upon the law to protect those acting on its behalf. The
international community has made an effort, albeit unsuccessful, to
strengthen the rule of law. In late 1993, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution addressing the "[q]uestion of responsibility for
attacks on U.N. and associated personnel and measures to ensure
that those responsible for such attacks are brought to justice" (the
1996]
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Question).? This Resolution established an "Ad Hoc Committee on
the Elaboration of an International Convention dealing with the
Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel"
(Ad Hoc Committee) to consider the Question, and placed the issue
on the agenda of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.'
Participation in the Ad Hoc Committee was open to all members of
the United Nations.26
The stated objective of the Ad Hoc Committee was to prepare a
draft convention that would enter into force within a short period of
time. ' During its meetings from March 28 to April 8, 1994,2's the Ad
Hoc Committee considered a proposal submitted by New Zealand
and Ukraine;' a working document submitted by Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden;2  a Note by the Secretary-General;2
and a number of proposals submitted by participating delegations.
The debates of the Ad Hoc Committee emphasized the need for an
international convention to ensure that U.N. personnel were not con-
sidered legitimate military targets. The report of this first session in-
cluded a negotiating text to be used at a second session.12 This nego-
tiating text included a general discussion of Articles 1 and 2
concerned with definitions and the application of the convention, and
a draft of Articles 3 to 27. The Ad Hoc Committee final report rec-
ommended that the General Assembly establish a Sixth Committee
working group to continue the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on its




208. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee of its first meeting set forth its agenda. See Pro-
visional Agenda of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of an Inter-
national Convention Dealing with the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated
Personnel, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIAC.242/L.1 (1994).
209. Proposal by New Zealand and Ukraine, Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of an
International Convention Dealing with the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associ-
ated Personnel, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIAC.242/L.2 and Corr. 1 (1994).
210. Proposal by New Zealand and Ukraine Corrigendum, Ad Hoc Committee on the
Elaboration of an International Convention Dealing with the Safety and Security of United
Nations and Associated Personnel, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.242/L.3 (1994).
211. Note by the Secretary General, Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of an Interna-
tional Convention Dealing with the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Per-
sonnel, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIAC.242/1 (1994).
212. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Work Carried Out During the Period from 28
March to 8 April 1994, Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of an International Convention
Dealing with the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 49th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.242/2 (1994).
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revised negotiating text."
On September 23, 1994, the General Assembly included the
Question on its agenda and referred it to the Sixth (Legal) Commit-
tee for consideration. The Sixth Committee established a Working
Group which used as its baseline document the work of the Ad Hoc
Committee, and submitted its report to the Sixth Committee on 8
November. 4 The Sixth Committee's report contained a draft
"Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Per-
sonnel" (Safety Convention) which it recommended to the General
Assembly for adoption.2  The General Assembly adopted the Safety
Convention of the Sixth Committee on December 9, 1994.16
B. Scope of Application
The second of the twenty-nine articles of the Safety Convention
very carefully limits its applicability. Paragraph 1 of Article 2 pro-
vides as follows: "This Convention applies in respect of United Na-
tions and associated personnel and United Nations operations, as de-
fined in Article 1.,,217 The terms "United Nations personnel" and
"associated personnel" are broadly defined by Article I to include all
persons either engaged in or deployed in support of a U.N. operation,
regardless of whether they are military, police, or civilian."' As long
as they are engaged in or deployed in support of the mandate of a
"United Nations operation," as defined by Article 1, the Safety Con-
vention protects those working for the United Nations, its specialized
agencies, a government or intergovernmental organization, and per-
213. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of an International Convention
Dealing with the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Ad Hoc
Committee on the Elaboration of an International Convention Dealing with the Safety and Se-
curity of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/49/22 (1994).
214. Report of the Working Group, U.N. GAOR Sixth Committee, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc.
AIC.6/49/L.4 (1994).
215. Report of the Sixth Committee, U.N. GAOR Sixth Committee, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/49/742 (1994).
216. Safety Convention, supra note 16. Two members of the U.S. delegation that negoti-
ated the Safety Convention have published commentary on its evolution and key articles. Evan
T. Bloom, Protecting Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Asso-
ciated Personnel, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 621 (1995); Steven J. Lepper, The Legal Status of Military
Personnel in United Nations Peace Operations: One Delegate's Analysis, 18 HOUs. J. INT'L L.
359 (1996).
217. Safety Convention, supra note 16, art. 2(1), 34 I.L.M. at 486 (emphasis added).
218. Id. art 1, 34 I.L.M. at 486.
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sons deployed by a humanitarian non-governmental organization.2"9
The term "United Nations personnel" provides coverage, for ex-
ample, to officials and experts on mission of the United Nations, as
well as blue-hatted personnel such as "members of the United Na-
tions Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), the
United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)." m "Associated per-
sonnel" include those military personnel deployed by their govern-
ment at the request of the United Nations to operate in support of a
blue-helmeted force, such as members of the "forces of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization asked to assist UNPROFOR in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Multinational Force assisting UNMIH, and U.S. as-
sistance under the Unified Task Force in Somalia."'"
Despite this broad coverage, Article 1 narrowly defines "United
Nations operations" as only those "established by the competent or-
gan of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations and conducted under United Nations authority and
control."n This emphasized language restricts the protections of the
Safety Convention to personnel engaged in or deployed in support of
U.N. directed operations. It specifically excludes protection for per-
sonnel participating in U.N. authorized operations, i.e., not under
U.N. authority and control, that are conducted by Member States in-
dependent of directed operations t  This limitation creates a gap in
the treatment of personnel serving the United Nations. Since the
United Nations does not have its own military force, it is likely in a
crisis situation-when protection is needed the most-that the Secu-
rity Council may chose the option of authorized multinational opera-
tions to precede directed operations.
Article 1 further limits protected U.N. operations to only two
categories: those conducted for the purpose of maintaining or re-
storing international peace and security and those specifically deter-
mined by the Security Council or General Assembly, for the purposes
of the Safety Convention, to pose an exceptional risk to the safety of
its personnel' 4 These limitations are unnecessarily restrictive and
create another gap in the treatment of personnel serving the United
219. See id.
220. Bloom, supra note 216, at 623-624.
221. Id.




Nations. By its own terms, the Safety Convention clearly does not
offer any protection to a U.N. humanitarian operation authorized by
the Security Council under its Chapter VI authority or by the Gen-
eral Assembly unless an operation-specific declaration is made that
the personnel participating in the operation are at exceptional risk.'
This approach ignores the operational context of political, economic,
or social instability that is normally the reason for a U.N. operation
in the first place, and fails to protect personnel involved in an opera-
tion which may become dangerous without adequate notice that al-
lows for a declaration of risk. Apparently the negotiators considered
language that would automatically cover humanitarian operations
and election-monitoring missions, but abandoned that option because
they were unable to compile a comprehensive list of covered opera-
tions. 6
C. The Combatant Exception to the Scope of Application
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 further curtails the scope of application
of the Safety Convention. While the Safety Convention affords a
limited category of military personnel who participate in U.N. di-
rected operations a protected status under international law, the un-
intended effect of paragraph 2 of Article 2 is to codify the principle
that military personnel of a U.N. force who use armed force in self-
defense or to accomplish their mission may easily be deemed lawful
targets under international law. This combatant exception to the
scope of application reads as follows:
This Convention shall not apply to a U.N. operation authorized by
the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel
are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to
which the law of international armed conflict applies.7
This exception is ill-conceived for two reasons. First, it applies a
pre-Charter law of war threshold to post-Charter peace-keepers.
This pre-Charter approach endangers the very personnel the Safety
Convention was intended to protect by using a subjective, de facto
threshold for the application of the law of international armed con-
225. See id.
226. See Bloom, supra note 216, at 623.
227. Safety Convention, supra note 16, art. 2(2), 34 I.L.M. at 487.
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flict: (1) that is so low it excludes the application of the Safety Con-
vention for most modem Chapter VII operations, and (2) that blurs
the line of demarcation between the application of the Safety Con-
vention and the law of international armed conflict.
Second, this exception intentionally excludes protection for
those military personnel exposed to the greatest risk, i.e., those who
have been authorized by the Security Council to protect the interna-
tional community from outright aggression.
The intent of the drafters was to create "a clear separation be-
tween the new legal regime under the instrument being drafted and
the [four] Geneva Conventions [of 1949], so that U.N. and associated
personnel and those who attack them would be covered under one
regime or the other, but not both."m Although the application of the
two legal regimes are mutually exclusive by the very terms of Article
2(2), there is not a clear separation between the two regimes. It is
fundamentally important to clarify this separation of legal regimes
and to maximize the application of the Safety Convention because
the protections provided by the regimes are completely divergent;
i.e., military personnel protected by the Safety Convention are un-
lawful targets and military personnel that are combatants protected
by the law of international armed conflict are lawful targets and may
be lawfully killed on sight by an enemy personnel. The Safety Con-
vention further endangers members of a U.N. force by making all of
them lawful targets if any of them are covered by the law of interna-
tional armed conflict.'
The threshold set forth in Article 2(2) for the application of the
Safety Convention is described in negative terms, i.e., if the condi-
tions of Article 2(1) are otherwise met, then the Safety Convention
applies only if the U.N. operation is not "authorized by the Security
Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII... in which any
of the personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed
forces and to which the law of international armed conflict applies." M
There are two general conditions of this paragraph 2 threshold which
must be analyzed to determine the application of the Safety Conven-
tion.
The first condition is whether the U.N. operation has been
"authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under
228. Bloom, supra note 216, at 625.
229. Safety Convention, supra note 16, art. 2(2), 34 I.L.M. at 487.
230. Id.
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Chapter VII."23' An Agenda for Peace defines situations where the
Security Council authorizes military action in response to outright
aggression, imminent or actual, with forces made available to it on a
permanent basis under Article 43 of the Charter as peace-
enforcement23 2 Due to the lack of standardized terminology in the
international community, however, the term "enforcement action"
has been applied to Security Council decisions that authorize coer-
cive peace-keeping.23' For example, even the Secretary-General of
the United Nations referred to Chapter VII actions "to create condi-
tions for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia and Rwanda" as
enforcement actions.m In practice, therefore, what constitutes an en-
forcement action is not clear.
The second condition is whether "any of the personnel are en-
gaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to which the
law of international armed conflict applies."23' 5 This condition-is the
fatal flaw of the Safety Convention that must be reconciled before
the Safety Convention is allowed to enter into force. As discussed in
the previous section on the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the
test for the application of the law of international armed conflict is a
de facto, subjective threshold codified by common Article 2 that is
intentionally set very low to capture all differences between the
armed forces of two states in order to afford maximum protection to
noncombatants and combatants.' This intentionally low threshold
for the application of the law of international armed conflict is anti-
thetical to the very notion of maximizing protections for U.N. and as-
sociated personnel.
The difficulty in the context of the Safety Convention of apply-
ing this common Article 2 threshold is that all peace-keepers de-
ployed by the United Nations are authorized to use armed force in
self-defense, and coercive peace-keeping forces are authorized to use
231. Id.
232. AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 17, paras. 42-44.
233. As previously defined in the present Article, "coercive peace-keeping" signifies Secu-
rity Council authorization to Member States to use armed force by deploying a neutral and im-
partial military presence in areas of tension or conflict, not necessarily with the consent of all
the parties concerned, for the purposes of a limited mandate short of stopping an aggressor or
imposing a cessation of hostilities.
234. SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 41, para. 78.
235. Safety Convention, supra note 16, art. 2(2), 34 I.L.M. at 487.
236. See 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION IV COMMENTARY, supra note 114, at 17-21; LAwS OF
WAR, supra note 108, at 169-70.
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armed force to accomplish their mission in accordance with the man-
date of the Security Council3 7 Article 21 of the Safety Convention
specifically states that nothing "in this Convention shall be construed
so as to derogate from the right to act in self-defence."2' 8 Conse-
quently, coercive peace-keeping forces begin their operation as non-
combatants and unlawful targets; however, when the Safety Conven-
tion applies the common Article 2 threshold to them, their
authorized use of armed force, at some undefined level of intensity,
makes them combatants and lawful targets. In addition to the lack of
clarity in determining this undefined level of intensity of force, the
application of this common Article 2 test to U.N. forces leads to a
perversion of the rule of law.
For example, application of this test allows the intensity of the
exchange of fire between the U.N. forces and their attackers to de-
termine the legality of the attack-regardless of the defensive nature
of the use of force by the U.N. personnel. It is untenable and pat-
ently absurd for the Safety Convention to allow members of
"organized armed forces" to determine the legality of their own attacks
on a U.N. force by controlling the amount of force used in the attack;
i.e., minor, small-scale attacks that result in only a few deaths would
be unlawful, but large-scale attacks with an intense exchange of fire
that result in many deaths would be lawful. Ironically, since this level
of intensity is unclear, Article 2 of the Safety Convention encourages
would-be attackers to ensure the legality of their actions by increas-
ing the size and intensity of their attack. Similarly, application of ex-
isting international law to U.N. forces without any modification al-
lows members of "organized armed forces" to simply "declare" a
state of hostilities, thereby invoking the application of the law of in-
ternational armed conflict3 9
It is an equally absurd application of the law to conclude that the
very act of arresting a criminal makes the arresting personnel, if they
are military and not civilian, lawful targets. On June 5, 1993, a series
of armed attacks against UNOSOM II left twenty-four Pakistani
peace-keepers dead and fifty-seven injured.' 4 In response, the Secu-
rity Council reaffirmed the Secretary-General's existing authority
under Resolution 814 "to take all measures necessary against all
those responsible for the armed attacks... [and] to secure the inves-
237. See SUPPLEMENTTO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 41, paras. 33-36.
238. Safety Convention, supra note 16, art. 21,34 I.L.M. at 492.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 114-117.
240. See Report of the Commission, supra note 168, para. 117.
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tigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecu-
tion, trial and punishment." 24' Similarly, the leaders of the main So-
mali parties and other Somali community leaders urged the United
Nations to apply strong and effective sanctions against those respon-
sible for the attacks.14 2 It was feared by the Secretary-General that
the failure to respond to these heretofore unlawful attacks upon
UNOSOM II would send a message to the "world that attacks on
U.N. personnel could be carried out with impunity."43
Not surprisingly, however, those suspected of the attacks failed
to voluntarily surrender and armed force was necessary to implement
the "arrest warrant" issued by the Security Council.2" The Commis-
sion of Inquiry authorized by the Security Council to investigate the
armed attacks on UNOSOM II concluded that if "the actions by
UNOSOM II on June 5 were enforcement actions as the SNA
[Somali National Alliance] had been given unmistakable reasons to
view them, then the ensuing clash was not a peace-keeping but a
peace enforcement operation." 245 The Commission of Inquiry com-
pounded the issue of determining whether peace-keepers have be-
come combatants by suggesting that the determination should be
made by the criminals subject to arrest.24 Furthermore, if the efforts
of UNOSOM II to arrest suspects in the limited area of southern
Mogadishu were enforcement actions, then application of Article 2 of
the Safety Convention declares that all U.N. forces throughout So-
malia are combatants and lawful targets.
The dilemma of applying this threshold in an operational setting
is also captured by a particularly cogent footnote in the commentary
of one of the members of the United States delegation that negoti-
ated the Safety Convention. In drawing upon this experience as a
delegate and as an Attorney-Adviser for United Nations Affairs in
the Office of the Legal Adviser for the U.S. Department of State,
Evan Bloom made the following personal observation:
There may be some situations in which attacks against peacekeep-
ers, criminalized under this Convention, lead to a level of conflict
that results in the applicability of common Article 2, i.e., interna-
241. S.C. Res. 837, supra note 169.
242. See THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOMALIA, supra note 41, at 50.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 50-55.
245. Report of the Commission, supra note 168, para. 250.
246. See id.
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tional armed conflict. Nevertheless, the negotiators of the Conven-
tion intended that all attacks outside the context of Chapter VII en-
forcement operations be criminalized. As a result, there is a narrow
band of cases (combat situations in non-Chapter VII peacekeeping
operations) where attackers can be both criminals and subject to
the rules applicable to combatants in international armed conflicts.
An important reason for permitting this overlap is to ensure that
peacekeepers do not lose the benefits of the Convention simply be-
cause they respond in self-defense and fighting ensues. Domestic
courts, reviewing such self-defense situations and misconstruing the
Geneva Conventions or having difficulty figuring out when
"combat" has commenced, might otherwise leap to the conclusion
that actions of the attackers are covered by the Geneva Conven-
tions and not by this Convention. 7
This observation acutely outlines the lack of clarity in the im-
plementation of Article 2 of the Safety Convention by recognizing
the likelihood of confusion in domestic courts, and by observing that
the Safety Convention and the Geneva Conventions must be inter-
preted to overlap in some circumstances to maintain the intent of the
negotiators to criminalize all attacks outside the context of Chapter
VII enforcement operations. This overlap is contrary to the explicit
terms of Article 2(2) which provides for two mutually exclusive legal
regimes, and contrary to the earlier expressed intent of the negotia-
tors that only one regime would apply, not both.
The lack of clarity of the separation between the application of
these two regimes has also been highlighted by the American Bar As-
sociation (ABA). In its Recommendation on the Safety Convention,
the ABA supported ratification of the Safety Convention by the
United States.m It also recommended that the United States and
other parties interpret the convention in such a way as to require the
application of the law of international armed conflict to Chapter VI
and Chapter VII operations.24 9 Thus, the ABA clearly endorses the
principle that the defensive use of force by members of a Chapter VI
force may make them combatants and lawful targets. In its support-
ing Report, the ABA states that in "practice, however, it has often
been difficult to maintain a clear distinction between peacekeeping
and peace enforcement .... In the Congo, Somalia and the former
247. Bloom, supra note 216, at 625-26.
248. A.B.A. House of Delegates, Recommendation and Supporting Report on the Conven-




Yugoslavia, the line between Chapter VI peacekeeping and Chapter
VII enforcement has not always been clear, either to the UN forces
or to outside observers."
D. Additional Provisions
The Safety Convention obligates Member States to criminalize
enumerated acts against U.N. or associated personnel under its na-
tional law."5 This national approach was prudent because most states
do not recognize international criminal conventions as self-executing.
However, in addition to creating a crime of universal jurisdiction, this
convention creates a substantive crime under international law that
would be subject to prosecution in an appropriate international tri-
bunal or national court.5
Although the remaining articles could have been drafted with
more specificity to overcome problems encountered under similar
conventions, they are an excellent start in establishing protections for
U.N. personnel. Articles 3 through 8 define the status of United Na-
tions and associated personnel. In its requirement that protected
units, vehicles, vessels, and aircraft shall bear distinctive identifica-
tion, and that protected personnel shall carry identification docu-
ments, Article 3 should have explicitly provided that the protections
of the Convention are not contingent on whether proper identifica-
tion is displayed, but on the status of the personnel and equipment.
This distinction is important when considering the language of Arti-
cle 8, which imposes a duty to release detained persons protected by
the Convention when "their identification has been established."
While proper identification is important to ensure recognition of pro-
tected persons, it should be clear that the failure to carry or the loss
of identity documents does not deprive a person from the protections
of the Convention.
The duties of States Parties are outlined in Articles 7 through 16.
Article 7 provides that "United Nations and associated personnel,
their equipment and premises shall not be made the object of attack
250. Id. Only a "Recommendation" becomes ABA policy. Supporting reports accompany
the Recommendation through the approval process within the ABA and are frequently pub-
lished alongside the Recommendation. See id.
251. Safety Convention, supra note 16, art. 9,34 I.L.M. at 488.
252. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Work Carried out During the Period from
28 March to 8 April 1994, supra note 212, paras. 20, 23; Safety Convention, supra note 16, art.
10, 34 I.L.M. at 488-89; Bloom, supra note 216, at 626-27.
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or of any action that prevents them from discharging their mandate."
Collectively, they impose a duty on all States Parties to ensure the
safety of protected personnel from the crimes enumerated in Article
9, to cooperate with one another in the prosecution of alleged of-
fenders, and to prosecute or extradite. Most importantly, States Par-
ties are also required to take such measures to establish national ju-
risdiction over the specified crimes, which include the intentional
commission of murder, kidnapping, an attack upon the person, a
violent attack upon the official premises or vehicle in a manner likely
to endanger a protected person, and a threat to commit any specified
crime." Accomplices and conspirators can also be prosecuted under
the Convention."
No recognition is made, however, that an international tribunal
could have concurrent jurisdiction, and there are no exceptions to
preclude the Safety Convention from applying to crimes among
members of a force of different nationalities. Thus, the Safety Con-
vention could arguably give criminal jurisdiction to an international
tribunal, or even the domestic courts of another state, over United
States service members who got in a fight with another protected per-
son. This would clearly be in conflict with the agreements between
the Secretary-General and contributing states that normally provide
for exclusive criminal jurisdiction for members of national contin-
gents.
Articles 17 through 19 impose upon State Parties the duty to
treat alleged offenders fairly, notify the Secretary-General of the fi-
nal outcome of any proceedings, and to disseminate the Convention
as widely as possible. The remaining articles consist of a savings
clause, an acknowledgment that the Convention does not impair the
right to act in self-defense, and the final clauses typically found in an
international convention.
E. Conclusion
On the surface, the Safety Convention is a commendable step
toward the protection of persons acting on behalf of the United Na-
tions, but it has created disparate treatment for and endangered the
very personnel it was intended to protect. Its greatest value is that it
reflects an international consensus to create a new category of inter-
nationally protected persons. Its greatest shortcoming is that its de-
253. See Safety Convention, supra note 16, art. 9,34 I.L.M, at 488.
254. See id.
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fined category of protected U.N. personnel is too narrowly circum-
scribed and the line that it attempts to draw between peace-keeping
and peace-enforcement is unclear. Although the approach taken re-
flects existing international law, albeit pre-Charter, it is an ill-
conceived application of the law in the context of coercive peace-
keepers and short-sighted application of the law in the context of
peace-enforcers.
By way of summary, the Safety Convention restricts its protec-
tions to personnel engaged in or deployed in support of U.N. directed
operations. It specifically excludes protection for personnel partici-
pating in U.N. authorized operations that are not under U.N. author-
ity and control and conducted by Member States independent of di-
rected operations. Additionally, the Safety Convention clearly does
not offer any protection to a U.N. humanitarian operation authorized
by the Security Council under its Chapter VI authority or by the
General Assembly unless an operation-specific declaration is made
that the personnel participating in the operation are at exceptional
risk.
Both of these gaps are created by the language in Article 1 that
defines U.N. operations. Accordingly, the definition of U.N. opera-
tions in Article 1 should be changed to automatically include all U.N.
operations, either directed or authorized, without the requirement of
any specific declaration. This can be accomplished by modifying the
definition of a U.N. operation in Article 1(c) as follows:
(c) "United Nations operation" means an operation established or
authorized by the competent organ of the United Nations in accor-
dance with the Charter of the United Nations. and conducted under
United Nations authority and contrl:.•
(i 0 hero the operatien is fo the purpose of maintaing or
restoring intornational peaco and scurity "r
(R) Where the Seeurity Couineil or the General Assembly has
deelared, for the purposes of this Convention, that there exists
an excoptional risk to the safety of the personnel participating
Article 2(2) also curtails the scope of application of the Safety
Convention. The Safety Convention applies only if the U.N. opera-
tion is not "authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement ac-
255. Additional language is indicated by the bold attribute and deleted language is lined-
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tion under Chapter VII... in which any of the personnel are engaged
as combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of
international armed conflict applies." 6 Paragraph 2 should be de-
leted in its entirety. These two corrections to Articles 1 and 2 of the
Safety Convention would allow coverage for members of all U.N.
forces, noncombatants and combatants alike, without exception. This
draws a clear line that puts potential offenders on notice of the inter-
nationally protected status of U.N. forces and affords maximum pro-
tection to military personnel serving the international community.
Ironically, in one of the first drafts submitted to the Ad Hoc
Committee, New Zealand proposed that persons who attack U.N.
personnel should be individually responsible, and included within the
protection of its draft Safety Convention all persons deployed by the
Secretary-General to participate in an operation established pursuant
to a mandate approved by Security Council resolution. 7 Protection
for persons involved in enforcement operations was not excluded by
the initial New Zealand draft.y Additionally, the working document
submitted by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden spe-
cifically included within the protection of its draft Safety Convention
"all personnel authorized by the United Nations to participate in a
peace-keeping or a peace-enforcement operation." 9 The broad ap-
proach of the Nordic draft had the support of other delegations dur-
ing the general debates of the Ad Hoc Committee; however, the ap-
proach that enforcement operations should be excluded from the
scope of application of the Safety Convention was adopted.2 °
The remaining articles should be redrafted for consistency with
the new category of protected persons that include members of all
U.N. authorized or directed operations, to clarify the duty to release
protected persons that are unlawfully detained, and to clarify that the
256. Safety Convention, supra note 16, art. 2(2), 34 I.L.M. at 487.
257. See Question of Responsibility for Attacks on United Nations and Associated Personnel
and Measures to Ensure that those Responsible for Such Attacks are Brought to Justice, U.N.
GAOR Sixth Committee, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/48/L.2 (1993).
258. See id.
259. Proposal by New Zealand and Ukraine Corrigendum, supra note 210.
260. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Work Carried out During the Period from
28 March to 8 April 1994, supra note 212. The reports of the Ad Hoc Committee are summa-
rized reports that do not record in any detail the debates of the Committee on this issue or the
rationale for the adoption of the approach to exclude enforcement operations. See, e.g., id.;
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of an International Convention Dealing
with the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note 213. The
Report of the Sixth Committee, supra note 215, also fails to record any discussion on this fun-
damental issue of application.
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crimes enumerated in the Safety Convention do not apply to crimes
among members of a U.N. force of different nationalities. Reserva-
tions or understandings to the Safety Convention, or operation-
specific pronouncements of the Security Council, cannot correct all of
the shortcomings of the Safety Convention. These weaknesses must
be addressed by modifying its text before ratification and entry into
force. As it is written, the Safety Convention does not protect the
U.N. forces-rather, it endangers them.
V. CONCLUSIONS: PROTECTING U.N. FORCES & GENEVA
PROTOCOL I
The difficulty in the implementation of the Safety Convention
and the application of existing international law to U.N. forces turns
upon the use of force. Since U.N. forces by definition operate in high
threat areas of actual or potential hostilities, the use of force is a
critical issue. The international community is now in the era of the
U.N. Charter which prohibits the aggressive use of force. War be-
tween states, as known in the pre-Charter era, is outlawed, and the
international community no longer stands by idly while a government
slaughters its own citizens.
Collectively, the Member States have granted the authority and
obligation to the Security Council to maintain international peace
and security, and when the peaceful settlement of dispute mecha-
nisms fail, the Security Council has the obligation to make recom-
mendations or decide what measures will be taken to maintain or re-
store international peace and security, including the possible use of
armed force. There is a revolution within the international commu-
nity-a tectonic shift in thinking-as to the very nature of peace-
keeping and the proper role for the use of armed force in U.N. peace
operations. In resolving this issue, the international community must
consider its policy in light of existing international law, and decide
whether that law needs to be changed to reflect the current practice
and the role being shaped for U.N. forces.
A. The International Community and the Use of Force on its Behalf
The principle that U.N. forces have the right to use force in self-
defense has not been much of a contested issue, but the issue of how
far this right of self-defense extends and the breadth of the right of
peace-keepers to use force to accomplish their mandate has proven
to be very contentious. Consider, for example, the recommendation
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of the British commander of U.N. forces in Bosnia to use a heavily
armed, rapid reaction force to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid
to besieged cities such as Sarajevo and to protect innocent civilians
from random mortar and artillery attacks."' The senior U.N. diplo-
mat in the Balkans rejected this proposal as too aggressive. 2 The
same U.N. diplomat had earlier issued orders that no operations will
be carried out in Bosnia by this Chapter VII force without the con-
sent of the Bosnian Serbs.2 3
The breadth of the right of U.N. forces to use armed force has
been a difficult issue for the international community. Historically,
peace-keeping has been purely a consensual activity, and a U.N. force
was only authorized to use force in self-defense.2 4 Internal conflicts
and humanitarian emergencies, however, have pressured the interna-
tional community to become increasingly more involved in coercive
peace-keeping. Consequently, the more a U.N. force must rely upon
armed force to accomplish its mission, the larger and more heavily
armed the force has to be, and the more difficult it is to muster inter-
national political will.
The international community is caught in a struggle between the
desire for its forces to remain completely impartial and the need to
use force to maintain international peace and security. When it has
tried to face this struggle and shape a use of force policy during on-
going operations, it has been criticized in the media for its pattern of
making half-hearted threats and then publicly backing down without
results.' While some scholars have found the recent coercive peace-
keeping practice of the Security Council troubling,2 one Italian
peace-keeper has written:
[T]raditional international peacekeeping initiatives are likely to be
useless in the face of complex conflicts, especially ethno-religious
ones, even for safeguarding basic human rights, let alone resolving
the crises .... As a result, there is ever wider acceptance of a UN
261. See John Pomfret, Reaction Force for Bosnia is Rapidly Fading Away: Role now Lim-
ited to Protecting U.N. Troops, WASH. POST, July 1,1995, at Al.
262. See iL
263. See John Pomfret, U.N. Restricts Troops' Enforcement in Bosnia, WASH. POST, June
11, 1995, at A27.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 47-53; SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE,
supra note 41, paras. 33-36.
265. See, e.g., Robert D. Kaplan, Catch the Bad Guys Now, WASH. POST, July 10, 1996, at
17.
266. See, eg., Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Security Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 506 (1995).
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policy of armed intervention in the name of humanitarianism.27
This peace-keeper also noted the disagreements within the multina-
tional force that arose during the armed intervention in Somalia as to
the breadth of the force sanctioned by the United Nations, high-
lighting the difficulties of implementing a use of force policy in a mul-
tinational setting.'
Despite the complexity and contentious nature of this issue, the
international community has demonstrated a clear trend in its desire
to authorize coercive peace-keeping forces to use force when neces-
sary to accomplish their respective missions. This trend began in De-
cember, 1992, when the Security Council authorized UNITAF to use
"all necessary means," 9 and has continued to date in the ongoing
operations in the former Yugoslavia. °
In an address on November 27, 1995, President Clinton de-
scribed the United States' role in implementing the General Frame-
work Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.2 He assured
the American public that the risks to United States forces operating
in the multinational implementation force (IFOR) authorized by the
Peace Agreement would be minimized:
They will be heavily armed and thoroughly trained. By making an
overwhelming show of force, they will lessen the need to use force.
But unlike the UN forces, they will have the authority to respond
immediately - and the training and equipment to respond with
overwhelming force - to any threat to their own safety or any viola-
267. Captain Fabio Ghia, Armed Intervention in UN Peacekeeping: The Necessity for
Change, XLIX NAVAL WARC. REV. 131, 132 (Summer 1996) (Captain Ghia is an officer in the
Italian navy).
268. See id. at 131,134.
269. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 55.
270. For example, the rules of engagement for UNOSOM II authorize deadly force when
necessary to "resist attempts by forceful means to prevent the Force from discharging its du-
ties." THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, JA 422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK,
at 8-10 to 8-12 (1996) (providing a general discussion of rules of engagement, and contains
copies of selected unclassified pocket cards that summarize applicable rules of engagement for
training and guidance purposes at the tactical level) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK]. The Combined Joint Task Force that conducted civil-military operations in Haiti
(CJTF-Haiti), was authorized to use deadly force, when necessary, to detain persons observed
committing serious criminal acts. See id. Similarly, the United Nations Mission in Haiti
(UNMIH), which authorized the use of necessary force as required to carry out assigned du-
ties. See id..
271. Address to the Nation on Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 31 WKLY. CoMP. PRES. DOc 2060 (Dec. 4, 1995).
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tions of the military provisions of the peace agreement. 2
Subsequently, the Security Council authorized Member States to
establish IFOR and "to take all necessary measures, at the request of
IFOR, either in defence of IFOR or to assist the force in carrying out
its mission, and recogniz[ed] the right of the force to take all neces-
sary measures to defend itself from attack or threat of attack."2  In
keeping with this grant of authority, NATO issued rules of engage-
ment for IEFOR that authorize the use of minimum force necessary to
accomplish assigned missions.'
Senator D'Amato stated that the United States has the legal
authority and the moral obligation "to seek out, collect, protect, and
provide to the tribunal much evidence of violations of international
humanitarian law as we are able to discover within the United States
zone in Bosnia." 5 Armed with Bradley fighting vehicles and ma-
chine guns, IFOR protected a team of war crimes investigators, who
were working at a suspected mass grave outside Srebrenica, from any
potential interference by the Bosnian Serbs2 6 IFOR has also been
authorized to arrest indicted war criminals if they encounter them for
transfer to the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, but
despite pressure otherwise, IFOR has not been authorized by its po-
litical leadership in NATO to actively seek out these indicted crimi-
nals.'
During his Commencement address to the University of Mary-
land's European Division at Manheim, Germany, on May 26, 1996,
Judge Richard Goldstone, the Chief Prosecutor of the International
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, noted that IFOR has the right to
use force, if necessary, to arrest suspected war criminals."8 He also
urged IFOR to take a more robust approach in arresting suspects and
condemned IFOR's policy of refraining from action because of the
272. Id. at 2063.
273. S.C. Res. 1031, supra note 64, paras. 14,17 (emphasis added).
274. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 270, at 8-13.
275. 141 CONG. REC. S18592 (daily ed. Dec. 14,1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
276. See Julius Strauss, Threat to Ban Serb Party from Pool if Karadzic Stays, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), July 9,1996, at 12.
277. See Christopher Bellamy, The Hunter Who Hopes to Catch Karadzic, INDEPENDENT
(London), July 10,1996, at 20.
278. Judge Richard Goldstone, Address at the University of Maryland European Division
at Mannheim, Germany (May 26, 1996) (copy on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative &
International Law).
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dangers involved. 9 Comparing IFOR's role to that of national po-
licemen, Judge Goldstone said that it is not conceivable that an at-
torney-general would call off arrests because of the possible risks to
the policemen whose duty it is to effect the arrests.'
The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping
Operations has also noted this trend in the change in the nature of
peace-keeping operations. Mr. Kofi Annan stated in 1993 that at "no
time since its inception has the nature or the concept of peace-
keeping been as open to redefinition as it is at this juncture ... the
view we had held during the first four decades of the United Nations
existence on the essence of peace-keeping has begun to change. ' ' '
The revolution in the international community on the issue of the use
of force during coercive peace-keeping operations has not ended, but
it has begun to take shape. Despite the problems of implementation
and application of existing international law, it is clear that the inter-
national community desires its peace-keepers to be its international
police force with the authority to use force to defend itself and ac-
complish its assigned missions, such as arresting international crimi-
nals and maintaining international peace and security.
B. The Contentious Issue of Protecting U.N. Peace-Keepers and
Combatants
If the international community is willing to allow the majority of
its U.N. forces to be lawful targets under the coercive peace-keeping
circumstances in which these forces are most likely to be deployed,
then the status quo of international law is adequate. This status quo
accepts the existing international legal regime that protects U.N.
forces as adequate, and embraces the Safety Convention as all that is
necessary to fill in the gap.
If, however, the international community is concerned about the
safety of those military personnel who serve as its peace-keepers in
its new paradigm, even though they may be authorized to use armed
force in self-defense and to accomplish their mission, then interna-
tional law must be changed and the Safety Convention must not be
allowed to enter into force as it is written. The application of existing
international law by the Safety Convention allows members of
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. Kofi A. Annan, UN Peace-keeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO, 41
NATO REv., Oct. 1993, No. 5, at 3.
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"organized armed forces" to determine the legality of their own at-
tacks on a U.N. force by controlling the amount of force used in the
attack or by simply making a declaration of war. This application
also makes the arresting military personnel lawful targets if force is
necessary to arrest suspected war criminals. Furthermore, the Safety
Convention unnecessarily restricts its protections to a very limited
category of military personnel, and intentionally excludes protection
for those peace-enforcers who have been authorized by the Security
Council to protect the international community from outright aggres-
sion.
The General Assembly has expressed its concerns about the
safety of U.N. forces on numerous occasions, ' and the Security
Council has frequently declared that individuals will be held account-
able for violations of international humanitarian law and attacks on
U.N. forces and relief personnel.2m Professor Tom Farer of The
American University was engaged by the Secretary-General to inves-
tigate the June 5, 1993 attacks on UNOSOM IIH ? Professor Farer
concluded that
[n]o act could by its very character more perfectly exemplify an in-
ternational crime than the use of force against United Nations sol-
diers to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities. Such
use of force is a plain challenge to the ability of the United Nations
to maintain international peace and security and hence to that
minimum order on which all other collective human interests de-
pend.m
To adequately protect military personnel involved in U.N. peace
operations, the international community should take a three-step ap-
proach. First, the Safety Convention should be rewritten as sug-
gested above. Reservations or understandings to the Safety Conven-
tion cannot correct all of the shortcomings of the Safety Convention
282. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 48/37, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A148/37 (1993); G.A.
Res. 48/42, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/48142 (1993); G.A. Res. 47/120A, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/120A (1992); G.A. Res. 47/120B, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/47/120B (1992).
283. See discussion supra Part III on United Nations Security Council resolutions in the
previous section on existing legal protections accorded military forces.
284. See Report Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 837 (1993) on the
Investigation Into the 5 June 1993 Attack on United Nations Forces in Somalia Conducted on
Behalf of the Secretary-General by Professor Tom Farer, para. 3, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/26351 (1993), reprinted in THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOMALIA, supra note 41, at 296.
285. Id. para. 7.
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as it is written. The corrections proposed would allow coverage to
members of all U.N. forces, without exception, and clarify a number
of ambiguities. This approach affords maximum protection to mili-
tary personnel serving the international community. Second, existing
international law must be changed to protect all military personnel
who serve in U.N. forces, noncombatants and combatants alike.
Even without the Safety Convention in place, common Article 2 of
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 still endangers the safety of
military personnel who are directed by the international community
to use force. The only way to create a new category of protected per-
sons of this nature under international law is by convention. A draft
convention that will accomplish this is discussed in the next section.
Finally, until the Safety Convention can be rewritten and a new con-
vention that protects peace-keepers enters into force, each enabling
U.N. resolution, whether it be under the authority of Chapter IV, VI,
or VII, that authorizes the deployment of a U.N. force should declare
that the members of the force are not combatants so long as their use
of force is within the mandate, and that all attacks on the force con-
stitute an international crime.
C. The Draft Geneva Protocol III
One mechanism to create a new category of protected persons
that includes all military personnel involved in United Nations peace
operations is the attached "Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Ci-
vilians and Military Forces operating under the authority of the
United Nations" (Draft Protocol III)." Unlike the Safety Conven-
tion, the scope of application of Draft Protocol III includes all per-
sonnel, civilians and military, whether they are U.N. peace-keepers
or peace-enforcers, i.e., whether they are noncombatants or combat-
ants, and makes them unlawful targets under all circumstances.
No one would dare suggest that officials or representatives of the
United Nations, members of the ICRC, members of non-
governmental organizations, or even international civilian policemen
who are authorized to use deadly force, should be lawful targets. It
286. Appendix to the present Article. The format and substance of the Draft Protocol III is
generally based on a number of other conventions and documents such as the Safety Conven-
tion; various Security Council resolutions; the four Geneva Conventions of 1949; Protocol I;
Protocol II; and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Interna-
tionally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14,1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975.
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seems incomprehensible to reason that military personnel deserve
lesser protection while in the service of the international community.
Civilians and military personnel alike have volunteered to risk their
lives for those worthy principles the international community has
enumerated in the Charter, and there is no rational argument to
place a lesser value on the lives of those civilians who chose to serve
the international community in uniform.
Several key principles underpin the rationale for the proposed
rule of law reflected in the Draft Protocol III. First, all personnel
who serve the international community, military as well as civilians,
deserve the maximum protection that the international community
has to offer. Second, as a corollary principle to the first, no one, mili-
tary or civilian, who serves the international community deserves to
be a lawful target. Third, military personnel who serve the interna-
tional community do so under the legal authority of and at the politi-
cal direction of the Security Council or the General Assembly.
Fourth, military personnel who serve the international community
are expected to serve as its police force, and they have a duty to use
armed force, when necessary, to accomplish their mission. Fifth,
these military personnel are international personnel who perform an
international function by enforcing the laws of the international
community. Accordingly, the use of force should be attributed to the
United Nations and not individual states. Sixth, without these ava-
tars of international peace and security who implement the Security
Council's coercive authority, the international community has no en-
forcement mechanism and international law.
It is undisputed that the law of international armed conflict ap-
plies to United Nations forces. The Draft Protocol III does not
change the application of the existing law of international armed con-
flict to U.N. forces or any other party to a conflict but for one excep-
tion. It simply creates a new category of protected persons under in-
ternational law-persons who serve the international community
under the authority of the United Nations that are unlawful targets
under all circumstances. This category of protected persons reflects
the new role of military forces that serve the international community
during U.N. peace operations.
Coercive peace-keeping and peace-enforcement action under the
Charter should not be viewed as mutual combat between states in a
pre-Charter era when waging war was lawful. To the contrary, coer-
cive peace-keeping and peace-enforcement actions are a concerted
attempt by the international community to address a humanitarian
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crisis or to thwart a threat to international peace and security. It is
only a visceral fright of undermining the pre-Charter, outdated dis-
tinction between jus in bello and jus ad bellum that most rely upon to
discredit a protected status for all U.N. forces, noncombatants and
combatants alike.
Hugo Grotius is credited with having developed the pre-Charter
distinction between jus in bello and jus ad bellum, that is, "the theory
of the equal application of the jus in bello irrespective of the justice
of a party's resort to force."' ' At the time Grotius developed this
theory of equal application, the just war theories of jus ad bellum
were more highly developed than the jus in bello2m The rationale for
the theory was the lack of an effective method of determining the
lawfulness of the aggression. 9 Given the modern justification that an
unequal application would undermine jus in bello, it is ironic that
those rules were so undeveloped when the theory of equal applica-
tion was developed. Indeed, given the role of the Security Council,
the rationale for Grotius' theory of equal application no longer exists
in contemporary Charter practice.
A contemporary discussion by one author notes that the tradi-
tional principles of jus ad bellum have been fundamentally changed
by the Charter system and restricted to the use of force principles
codified in the Charter,2' eroding in practice the distinction between
jus in bello and jus ad bellum. 9' In a discussion focusing on the evolu-
tion of international rule of proportionality (as a component of both
the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello) under the Charter system of
conflict management, Professor Judith Gail Gardam made the fol-
lowing observations:
The jus ad bellum and the jus in bello are themselves generally re-
garded as independent sets of rules and the relationship between
the two has also remained largely unexplored. What debate there
has been has arisen in the context of whether the rules on the con-
duct of hostilities are affected by the legality of the resort to force.
Most commentators take the position that the rules must be applied
equally, as exemplified in the Preamble to Protocol I. Events in the
287. Judith G. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
391,396 (1993).
288. See id.
289. See id. at 411.
290. See id. at 403.
291. See id. at 393-94.
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recent gulf conflict demonstrate that this analysis is too simplistic.
The practice of states in that conflict reveals that the legality of a
state's resort to force has a subtle impact on the perception by that
state of the means that can legitimately be used to achieve its goal.
Thus, in reality, the jus ad bellum to some extent may determine the
jus in bello .... Moreover, the almost-unprecedented role of the
Security Council in determining the a2 gressor is clearly a significant
factor in any analysis of these 
events.
And:
Since the gulf conflict, it is difficult to see how it can be argued that
the rules regulating the conduct of armed conflict are unaffected by
considerations relating to the use of force .... Clearly, as long as
there is any prevailing theory of the jus ad bellum, it will always af-
fect the jus in bello.293
Professor Gardam concluded, however, that this de facto erosion
of the theory of equal application is alarming because it "will result in
the application of lower standards by states in the pursuit of their
objectives., 2 4 This conclusion is not supported by a single example,
and fails to acknowledge that this de facto erosion that she observed
under the Charter system is a reflection of state practice and evolving
customary international law. To the contrary, Professor Gardam re-
inforced the evolving state practice in her observation that
[t]he suggestion that the rules regulating the conduct of armed hos-
tilities may be affected by the legal status of the resort to force is
not new. Ever since the attempts to outlaw the use of force began
in this century, it has been possible to argue that there should not
necessarily be complete equality in the application of the laws of
war, as one state will have resorted to unlawful aggression.
295
Professor Gardam did support her proposition that the equal
application of the jus in bello should continue under the Charter sys-
tem with a three-point analysis. First, she noted that any theory of
unequal application "assumes an effective method of determining the
lawfulness of the aggression., 291 While noting that this determination
is the role of the United Nations, she concluded that such a determi-
292. Id. at 392-94 (emphasis added).
293. Id. at 412 (emphasis added).
294. Id. at 394.
295. Id. at 410.
296. Id. at 410.
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nation by the Security Council "should have no legal impact on the
jus in bello of the conflict" because the basis of the contemporary
theory of equal application is the humanitarian nature of the jus in
bello.29 The humanitarian concern is that all "soldiers and civilians
are entitled to the benefit of the rules even if the state is engaged in
illegal hostilities."298
Second, Professor Gardam relied upon the judgment of the Nur-
emberg Military Tribunals that had the opportunity to modify the
theory of equal application, but declined to do so.21 While Nurem-
berg serves as an excellent judicial interpretation of the jus in bello,
these tribunals only had the authority to interpret existing interna-
tional law. The Nuremberg precedent must be placed in historical
perspective-the United Nations did not even exist during World
War II and the states did not fight under the authority of the Security
Council. Accordingly, the Nuremberg Tribunals did not have the
opportunity to rule upon whether the Charter system has modified
the theory of equal application of jus in bello.
Finally, Professor Gardam relied upon the practice of states
during the Persian Gulf War to support her proposition that the in-
ternational community had the opportunity to modify the theory of
equal application, but declined to explicitly do so.' She observed
that the "Security Council confirmed that the invasion of Kuwait by
Iraq was contrary to Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter ....
[and that no state] suggested that the illegality of this act relieved op-
posing states of the necessity of complying with the law of armed con-
flict." ' In practice, however, she concluded that it can be strongly
argued that reality was otherwise-that "the jus ad bellum has subtly
influenced the jus in bello ever since the demise of the view of the le-
gal neutrality of the resort to force by states." ' Despite Professor
Gardam's explicit recognition of contemporary state practice under
the Charter to the contrary, she concluded her three-point analysis
and her article with the following conclusion:
It would be a regrettable outcome of the new effectiveness of the
297. Id. at 411.
298. Id.
299. See id.
300. See id. at 411-12.
301. Id. at 411.
302. Id. at 412.
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Security Council if it has had the effect of undermining one of the
most fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict: the equal
application of the rules irrespective of the legal status of a party's
resort to force. 0
Notwithstanding Professor Gardam's conclusions, most of her
underlying analysis and observations concerning current state prac-
tice does support the Draft Protocol III and its approach to the jus in
bello. The Draft Protocol III retains the application of the jus in bello
in its entirety to all belligerents and is consistent with Professor Gar-
dam's humanitarian concerns. The only change to the jus in bello
proposed by the Draft Protocol III is to create a new category of pro-
tected persons that includes belligerent military forces acting under
the coercive authority of the Security Council. The Draft Protocol III
does not affect the theory of equal application vis-d-vis armed con-
flicts that have no military forces acting under the coercive authority
of the Security Council.
Professor Gardam's concerns that an unequal application of the
jus in bello "will result in the application of lower standards by states
in the pursuit of their objectives"' is not supported by any empirical
data. To the contrary, the reaction of Iraqi troops to the psychologi-
cal operations of the coalition during the Persian Gulf War strongly
suggests that a rule of law making an attack on coalition forces illegal
would have only encouraged Iraqi troops to surrender. 5 An Iraqi
division commander stated after the cease fire that psychological op-
erations were "the greatest threat to his troops' morale."' These
psychological operations consisted of leaflet drops and radio broad-
casts that "provided instructions on how to surrender, instilled confi-
dence that prisoners would be treated humanely, and provided ad-
vanced warning of impending air attacks, thus encouraging
desertion." ' Certainly, the knowledge of individual Iraqi troops that
their participation in unlawful aggression by attacking coalition
forces would add greater incentive for them to surrender and would
add a new dimension to the deterrence of unlawful aggression. Pro-
303. Id. at 413.
304. Id. at 394.
305. See CONDUcr OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT
TO TITLE V OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORIZATION AND
PERSONNEL BENEFITS ACT OF 1991 ([FILED PURSUANT TO] PUBLIC LAW 102-25), App. J at
20-23 (1992).
306. Id. at 20.
307. Id. at 20-21.
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fessor Gardam's conclusion that the international community should
maintain a clear distinction between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello
is a pre-Charter distinction that is invalid when applied to military
forces acting under the coercive authority of the Security Council.
In a more recent article, Professor Gardam considered "the ex-
tent to which legal restraints derived from the ius in bello and the ius
ad bellum apply to the Security Council when it is taking military en-
forcement action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Char-
ter."'' s In discussing the scope of the jus ad bellum during military
enforcement actions under the coercive authority of the Security
Council, Professor Gardam recognized the view that a fundamental
difference exists between states waging war and the Security Council
taking enforcement action:
Whereas, traditionally, a State waging war was entitled to do so to
the stage of complete annihilation and subjugation of the other
side, it can scarcely be maintained that United Nations action can
be pursued so far. Such "collective" or "enforcement" action, as
distinct from war, is limited to the measures necessary to resist ag-
gression and to maintain and restore international peace and secu-
rity.
She then stated that there are difficulties in assuming states involved
in military enforcement actions remain bound by their individual ob-
ligations under the ]us in bello, because the Security Council could
override these treaty obligations by operation of Articles 25 and 103
of the Charter.31° In her analysis of the application of the jus in bello
during military enforcement actions under the coercive authority of
the Security Council, Professor Gardam concluded that
[t]o apply the customary law of armed conflict to the Security
Council is not, however, the ideal situation. For example, as we
have seen, some of its provisions are not adapted for the United
Nations. Moreover, customary rules inevitably lag behind treaty
308. Judith G. Gardam, Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action,
17 MicH. J. INT'L L. 285,287 (1996).
309. Id. at 308-09 (quoting BowErr, supra note 35, at 54-55 (1964)).
310. See Gardam, supra note 308, at 313. Article 25 of the U.N. Charter provides: "The
Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the present Charter." Article 103 of the U.N. Charter provides: "In
the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obliga-
tions under the present Charter shall prevail."
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developments and there is always scope for disagreement as to the
exact status of any particular rule at any particular time.
31 1
She concluded her analysis with the recommendation "to devise
some mechanism by which the United Nations can undertake to
comply with the conventional rules of international humanitarian law
and to ensure that the States involved in peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement activities are aware of these obligations. 3 12 The Draft
Protocol III is a mechanism that would clearly delineate the applica-
tion of international humanitarian law to military forces acting under
the authority of the United Nations.
In analyzing the application of the law of international armed
conflict to U.N. military forces, many institutions and writers sug-
gested as long ago as 1963 that U.N. forces should have a special code
and should not be governed in all respects by the same law of interna-
tional armed conflict as national armies. 13 The approach envisioned
by the Draft Protocol III is clearly supported by the precedent of cur-
rent practice. Security Council Resolution 1031, for example, de-
mands that all "parties respect the security and freedom of move-
ment of IFOR and other international personnel," while explicitly
authorizing "such enforcement action by IFOR as may be necessary
to ensure implementation of that Annex [Annex 1-A: Military As-
pects of the Peace Settlement] and the protection of IFOR. 3 14 This
resolution clearly incorporates a new rule of law, one that recognizes
U.N. forces are a separate category of protected persons.
The recent conduct of maritime operations is another excellent
example of the international community's de facto recognition of a
protected status for U.N. forces. At a Symposium on Maritime In-
ternational Law in Chile, the United States participated in a discus-
sion on the status and scope of the rights of warships while conduct-
ing operations under the Chapter VII authority of the Security
Council. 5 The purpose of the meeting, attended by eighteen cour-
311. Gardam, supra note 308, at 319.
312. Id. at 319-20.
313. See FINN SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONs FORCES IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR
179 (1966).
314. S.C. Res. 1031, supra note 64, paras. 15,18.
315. Captain Bruce B. Davidson, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy, Status and
Rights of Warships in a Multinational Force Tasked to Enforce Security Council Resolutions in
Accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, Remarks at the Symposium on
Maritime International Law, Valparaiso, Chile (June 25,1996) [hereinafter Status and Rights of
Warships] (transcript on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
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tries, was "to establish a legal order or doctrine which would deter-
mine and govern with greater clarity Chapter VII of the U.N. Char-
ter, the possible operations, obligations and rights of the countries
and of naval forces in time of war or armed conflict on the sea.
3 16
The United States representative, Navy Captain Bruce B. David-
son, Judge Advocate General's Corps, focused his cogent presenta-
tion on Chapter VII operations short of armed conflict. He con-
cluded that the status of naval forces enforcing Chapter VII
resolutions is inconsistent with the pre-Charter status accorded neu-
trals and belligerents, and that this is an area that may require some
further development of the law.317 During the course of his analysis
Captain Davidson discussed the application of existing international
law:
While the law of neutrality defines who is a belligerent and who is a
non-belligerent, Chapter VII has modified the law of neutrality to
permit forces carrying out Chapter VII mandates to do certain
things without becoming belligerents. Forces in these circum-
stances should not be viewed as 'parties to the conflict' .... I do
not believe that, at this point, we can conclude that multinational
naval forces, because they are implementing a Chapter VII man-
date, could never be viewed as belligerents; that is, that they could
not legally be the object of attack by a party to the conflict ....
Determination of their status thus will rely on an objective, factual
assessment .... Of course, the exact point of transition between
not being a party to the conflict and belligerency will be very diffi-
cult to determine. However, there is a variety of actions that
should not be viewed as crossing the line-which would make these
forces lawful targets.31
Captain Davidson then discussed six maritime-related activities
that do not cross the line and thus give definition to the de facto pro-
tected status of U.N. forces during Chapter VII operations: presence
and deterrence operations for the purpose of showing resolve and de-
terring aggression; peace operations involving interpositional forces
or the monitoring of a cease fire agreement; humanitarian operations
potentially involving the use of force for noncombatant evacuation
316. Hernan Cisternas, Belligerents or Neutrals: The Status of U.N. Naval Forces is Ana-
lyzed, EL MERCURIO (Santiago, Chile), June 28, 1996 (author's translation) (on file with the
Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
317. See Status and Rights of Warships, supra note 315, at 8.
318. Id. at 8-9,11-12.
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operations; escorting flag vessels of non-belligerents possibly requir-
ing the use of force in either individual or collective self-defense;
maritime interception operations structured to be as non-intrusive as
possible but authorizing warning shots and disabling fire; and the ex-
ercise of the inherent right of self-defense imposing on a military
commander the obligation to use all necessary means available to de-
fend his or her unit. 9 In shaping the final contours of the protected
status of U.N. forces, it is important to note that maritime intercept
operations, as defined by Captain Davidson to be within the author-
ity of a noncombatant U.N. maritime force, have been traditionally
viewed in customary practice as either a belligerent act of blockade
or visit and search.'
The potential for the use of armed force is inherent in every
U.N. peace operation. Existing international law requires too much
subjective guesswork to determine whether U.N. forces are noncom-
batants or have become combatants because they have used armed
force at some undefined level of intensity. The proposed Draft Pro-
tocol III draws a clear line and protects members of U.N. forces un-
der all circumstances. It also codifies and advances the de facto pro-
tected status accorded U.N. forces by the Security Council and the
international community. This approach deters attacks against U.N.
forces, under all circumstances. In cases of unlawful aggression, this
approach holds the offending state, its head of state, and the individ-
ual soldier who knowingly attacks members of a U.N. force all crimi-
nally responsible, while otherwise maintaining the integrity of the law
of international armed conflict.
D. Final Reflections
The United Nations is on the cusp of formulating a new policy
toward coercive peace-keeping. Existing international law does not
provide clear or adequate protections for U.N. forces, particularly in
the context of their authority to use force to accomplish their mission.
The same logical process that has extended international protections
little by little to a number of categories of war victims-from
wounded and sick military personnel protected by the first Geneva
Convention in 1864; to civilians, prisoners of war, medical personnel,
and religious personnel protected by the four Geneva Conventions of
1949; and, later to the victims of internal armed conflicts protected by
319. See id. at 12-13.
320. See, e.g., COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 134, 11 7.6 -7.7.5.
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Protocol II-dictates that U.N. forces should likewise have a special
protected status.3 '
In keeping with this development of international law, it seems
more appropriate to address the issue of a special protected status for
U.N. and associated personnel in a separate protocol to the four Ge-
neva Conventions of 1949 instead of trying to rewrite the Safety Con-
vention to correct its many flaws. Although some of the articles are
very similar to the Safety Convention, the attached Draft Protocol III
is substantially different. The protocol greatly enhances the protec-
tions accorded U.N. and associated personnel, and increases the re-
sponsibilities of State Parties.
Although the Safety Convention was intended to create a pro-
tected status for U.N. and associated personnel, its incorporation of
the common Article 2 threshold to determine when the Safety Con-
vention applies actually endangers the limited category of U.N.
forces it attempts to protect, particularly those authorized by Chapter
VII of the Charter. Indeed, the ambiguity in existing international
law that allows military personnel participating in a U.N. peace-
enforcement operation to be lawfully targeted is a traditionalist, pre-
Charter approach that undermines deterrence, undermines the rule
of law, and undermines the Charter prohibition on the use of force.
The international community must consider the impact of existing in-
ternational law on the safety of U.N. forces as it develops its use of
force policy for its new coercive peace-keeping paradigm.
It is clear that the international community expects U.N. forces
to take on new coercive peace-keeping missions that involve the use
of force to accomplish the mission assigned to them by the interna-
tional community. The rule of law must be clarified and advanced to
protect military personnel who participate in U.N. peace operations;
however, the safety of U.N. forces cannot be assured simply because
the rule of law is made plain. Once a protected status is defined for
U.N. forces, it must be consistently enforced to be effective.
321. See 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION IV COMMENTARY, supra note 114, at 26.
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TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949,
AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
AND MILITARY FORCES
OPERATING UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS (PROTOCOL III)
PREAMBLE
The High Contracting Parties,
Proclaiming that civilian and military personnel operating under
the authority of the United Nations are servants of the international
community and deserve the maximum protection of international and
domestic law under all circumstances,
Recalling that every State has the duty, in conformity with the
Charter of the United Nations, to refrain in its international relations
from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,
Condemning the threat or use of force by any State except in
lawful self-defense as authorized by international law and recognized
by Article 51 of the Charter,
Recognizing the critical role of United Nations military forces in
the maintenance of international peace and security,
Aware of the changing nature of peace operations and the neces-
sity, under some circumstances, to authorize military forces to use
armed force to accomplish the mandate of the Security Council,
Reaffirming the rules of international humanitarian law per-
taining to the conduct of hostilities, particularly the rules contained in
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Geneva Protocols
of 1977 pertaining to the protection of victims of armed conflicts,
Confirming the application of these rules of international hu-
manitarian law to military forces operating under the authority of the
United Nations,
Noting, however, that traditional distinctions between jus in
bello and jus ad bellum are not applicable in the contemporary era of
the United Nations,
Declaring, therefore, that civilians and military members of
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United Nations forces are protected persons at all times,
Endorsing the customary practices and principles applicable to
United Nations operations codified in the draft Model Status-of-
forces agreement between the United Nations and Host Countries,
Concerned over the growing attacks against civilians and military
forces operating under the authority of the United Nations,
Emphasizing the need to ensure better protection for all civilians
and military forces who serve the United Nations,
Conscious of the international nature of crimes against the safety
of these civilians and military forces who serve the United Nations,
Mindful of the role of international criminal tribunals, and
In honor of the memory of those civilian and military personnel
who have died while in the service of the international community,
Have agreed on the following:
PART I: GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1 - Scope of Application
1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements international
humanitarian law without modifying its existing conditions of appli-
cation except as expressly provided herein, shall apply to all United
Nations and associated personnel during the conduct of all United
Nations operations in a host State and while in transit to such host
State.
2. This Protocol shall be applied without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status,
or on any other similar criteria (hereinafter 'adverse distinction'), to
all persons affected by the application of Article 1.
3. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of
affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the gov-
ernment, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and
order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial in-
tegrity of the State.
4. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for
intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of any State in the
territory of which that conflict occurs.
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Article 2 - Definitions
For the purposes of this Protocol:
1. "United Nations personnel" means:
a. Persons engaged or deployed by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations as members of the military, police or civilian
components of a United Nations operation; or,
b. Other officials and experts on mission of the United Nations,
its specialized agencies, or the International Atomic Energy
Agency who are present in an official capacity in either a host or
transit State.
2. "Associated personnel" means persons:
a. Assigned by a Government or an intergovernmental organi-
zation with the agreement of the competent organ of the United
Nations;
b. Engaged by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a
specialized agency, or the International Atomic Energy Agency;
or,
c. Deployed by a humanitarian non-governmental organization
or agency under an agreement with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, a specialized agency, or the International
Atomic Energy Agency;
to carry out activities in support of the fulfilment of the mandate
of a United Nations operation.
3. "United Nations operation" means an operation established
or authorized by the competent organ of the United Nations in ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
4. "Host State" means a State in whose territory a United Na-
tions operation is conducted.
5. "Transit State" means a State, other than the host State, in
whose territory United Nations and associated personnel are in tran-
sit or temporarily present in connection with a United Nations opera-
tion.
6. "Intentional commission" means actual knowledge of the vic-
tim's status as United Nations or associated personnel.
7. "International criminal tribunal of competent jurisdiction"
means any tribunal established by the competent organ of the United
Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations or es-
tablished by international convention that has jurisdiction over any of
the offenses as set forth in Article 4 of this Protocol.
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PART II: REPRESSION OF BREACHES
Article 3 - Duty of all States to Respect and Protect
1. United Nations and associated personnel may in no circum-
stances be attacked or subject to any action that prevents them from
discharging their mandate; they shall be respected and protected in
all circumstances. They shall be treated humanely and cared for by
all States without any adverse distinction.
2. Fixed establishments and all means of transportation of any
United Nations or associated personnel may in no circumstances be
attacked.
Article 4 - Enumerated Crimes
1. The intentional commission of:
a. murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty
of any United Nations or associated personnel;
b. a violent attack upon the official premises, the private ac-
commodation or the means of transportation of any United Na-
tions or associated personnel likely to endanger his or her per-
son or liberty;
c. a threat to commit any such attack with the objective of
compelling a physical or juridical person to do or to refrain from
doing any act;
d. an attempt to commit any such attack; and,
e. an act constituting participation as an accomplice in any
such attack, or in an attempt to commit such attack, or in organ-
izing or ordering others to commit such attack;
shall be made by each State Party a crime under its national law.
2. Each State Party shall make the crimes set out in paragraph 1
of this Article, wherever and by whomever they may occur, punish-
able by appropriate penalties which shall take into account their
grave nature, and shall take all appropriate steps to protect United
Nations and associated personnel from such crimes.
Article 5 - Identification
1. To facilitate identification and ensure maximum protection,
all United Nations and associated personnel may be issued appropri-
ate identification documents to carry, and shall wear, whenever prac-
ticable, the distinctive emblem of the United Nations in addition to
any other national markings.
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2. Fixed establishments and all means of transportation of any
United Nations or associated personnel shall be similarly marked,
whenever practicable, with the distinctive emblem of the United Na-
tions and may fly the distinctive flag of the United Nations in addi-
tion to any other national markings or flags.
3. The protected status of United Nations and associated per-
sonnel attaches by' virtue of their association with the United Na-
tions. The failure of United Nations and associated personnel to
carry appropriate identification documents or to wear distinctive
markings shall not in any way affect their protected status.
Article 6 - Duty Within Host and Transit States to Release
1. Except as otherwise provided in an applicable status-of-forces
agreement, if United Nations or associated personnel are captured or
detained within a host or transit State and their identification has
been established, they shall not be subjected to interrogation, and
they shall be promptly released and returned to United Nations or
other appropriate authorities. Pending their release, such personnel
shall be treated in accordance with universally recognized standards
of human rights and the principles and spirit of the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949.
2. The United Nations or other appropriate authorities shall be
immediately notified of the detention of persons who claim to be
United Nations or associated personnel whose identification cannot
be promptly established. Such detained persons shall not be sub-
jected to interrogation and shall be treated in accordance with uni-
versally recognized standards of human rights and the principles and
spirit of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 until their identification has
been established.
3. Any dispute that arises concerning the identification of United
Nations or associated personnel shall be submitted promptly to the
Secretary-General. The decision of this matter by the Secretary-
General shall be final.
Article 7 - Duty of State Parties to Ensure Safety and Security
1. State Parties shall disseminate this Protocol as widely as pos-
sible, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programs
of military instruction and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the
principles thereof may become known to the entire population.
2. State Parties shall take all appropriate measures within and
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outside their respective territories to ensure the safety and security of
United Nations and associated personnel, and shall cooperate with
the United Nations, any international criminal tribunal of competent
jurisdiction, and all other States, as appropriate, in the implementa-
tion of this Protocol, particularly in any case where the host State is
unable itself to take the required measures.
3. State Parties shall cooperate with the United Nations, any in-
ternational criminal tribunal of competent jurisdiction, and all other
States in the prevention of the crimes set forth in Article 4 by:
a. taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in
their respective territories for the commission of such crimes
within or outside their territories; and,
b. exchanging information and coordinating the taking of ad-
ministrative and other measures as appropriate to prevent the
commission of such crimes.
4. State Parties have an affirmative obligation to search for, ar-
rest, and either prosecute or extradite, all persons suspected of hav-
ing committed a crime as set forth in Article 4. This obligation is not
limited to the national territory of a State Party; it extends to all terri-
tories where a State Party is authorized by international law to exer-
cise jurisdiction.
a. State Parties which elect not to extradite a suspect, shall,
without exception and without undue delay, submit the case to
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. The fi-
nal outcome of these proceedings shall be promptly reported to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations and announced
publicly.
b. To the extent necessary, State Parties shall utilize this Proto-
col as the legal basis for extradition to any international criminal
tribunal of competent jurisdiction or to any other State, and shall
enact national legislation as required to implement their obliga-
tion to extradite as set forth in this paragraph.
5. State Parties shall, upon request, cooperate to the greatest ex-
tent possible with the United Nations, any international criminal tri-
bunal of competent jurisdiction, and all other States in their respec-
tive efforts to search for, arrest, prosecute, or extradite any person
suspected of having committed a crime as set forth in Article 4.
6. State Parties shall promptly transmit, to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, any international criminal tribunal of
competent jurisdiction, and all other States concerned, all pertinent
information it has concerning the victim, alleged offender, or circum-
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stances of any crime set forth in Article 4.
PART III: FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 8 - Savings Clause
Nothing in this Protocol shall affect:
1. The inherent right of United Nations and associated person-
nel to act in self-defense;
2. The rights and obligations of all States, consistent with the
Charter of the United Nations, regarding the consent to entry of per-
sons into their territories;
3. The obligation of United Nations and associated personnel to
act in accordance with the terms of the mandate of a United Nations
operation;
4. The right of all States which voluntarily contribute personnel
to a United Nations operation to withdraw their personnel from par-
ticipation in such operation; or,
5. The entitlement to appropriate compensation payable that
may be due from whatever source in the event of death, disability,
injury, or illness attributable to peace-keeping service claimed by
persons, or their heirs, voluntarily contributed by States to United
Nations operations.
Article 9 - Dispute Resolution
1. Except as provided in paragraph 3 of Article 6 of this Proto-
col, any dispute between two or more State Parties concerning the in-
terpretation or application of this Convention which is not settled by
negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbi-
tration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitra-
tion the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitra-
tion, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the
International Court of Justice by application in conformity with the
Statute of the Court.
2. Except for the dispute settlement provision of paragraph 3 of
Article 6 of this Protocol, a State Party may at the time of signature,
ratification, acceptance, or approval of this Protocol, or accession
thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by all or part of
paragraph 1 of this Article. The other State Parties shall not be
bound by paragraph 1 of this Article or the relevant part thereof with
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respect to any State Party which has made such a reservation.
3. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance
with paragraph 2 of this Article may at any time withdraw that reser-
vation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions.
Article 10 - Review Meetings
At the request of one or more State Parties, and if approved by a
majority of the State Parties, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations shall convene a meeting of the State Parties to review the
implementation of the Protocol, and any problems encountered with
regard to its application.
Article 11 - Signature
This Protocol shall be open for signature at United Nations
Headquarters in New York by all States for six months after the
signing of the Final Act and will remain open for a period of twelve
months.
Article 12 - Ratification, Acceptance or Approval
This Protocol is subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval.
Instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval shall be depos-
ited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 13 - Accession
This Protocol shall be open for accession by any State. The in-
struments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
Article 14 - Entry Into Force
1. This Protocol shall enter into force thirty days after twenty-
two instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession
have been deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions.
2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to
the Protocol after its entry into force, the Protocol shall enter into
force on the thirtieth day after the deposit by such State of its instru-
ment of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession.
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Article 15 - Denunciation
1. A State Party may denounce this Protocol by written notifica-
tion to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on
which notification is received by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
Article 16 - Authentic Texts
The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, Eng-
lish, French, Russian, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall
be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who
shall send certified copies thereof to all States.

